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Welcome labour
The<e are """" exismg _ (five Conventions aM two Recommendallons) 01 !he
InternationaJ l.abou' 0Igatizati0n (LO)Iha1 .... odopIed in 1920. 1959 aM 1966. Since
!hen. as tar as !he 1IillfId 01 fisheries is concemed, ognificant changes have oc:c:ooed. The
mos1 impor1ant among lhem are !he 1982 Unilod Nalions ConYentJoo 00 !he lAw 01 !he
Sea aM !he emergence 01 developing lXUlIries as !he woMs Iargesllish prodl.<:ef>.
The<e are now aboot 'El1IlIl p8!SOOS wotking solely in capture fisheries. woridwide
The olher sig1fficant development in !he past two decades has been !he emergence of
small-scale fisheries as an important source of employment. Income, nutritional security
aMlO<Bign exchange in many coastal devoIoping notions. Aided by ....... fTIIIliatufized
forms of p«lllUIsion. naVigation aMlish detection techniques. smal-scaJe Iishe<s a.. now
IistWlg tar beyond lheir tradilionaJ IisIing QIWlds. sometimes extending to olher exclusive
economx:zooas(EEZS)aM!hetighseas.A~_oo_is. lhere!ool.
a ..-no development not rrit lor rduslnaI fisheries, but also lor !he smaI-scaJe
fisheries.~ its c:tlanil"'l JlftIliIe aI CNfI( !he developing 1IillfId.
The proposed agenda lXlIlCOtlWlg a~ _ 00 _ in .... 1istWlg secta
at !he 92nd Session of !he lntema1ionaJ Ubour Coofor8nce in.kroe 2004 (see page 46)
8lMsageS a 10IaI ll!'Iisioo of !he exismg _Ids ~ !he ight of !he extension of
ItnIamenlaI~ iVld riI;1is at_Ill all Wlllkers. as IaxI down in !he LO Declara1Jon
of FlIldamenlaI~ and RighIs at WOII< aM its FoIow-<.\l.' Two of !he eXISting
Conventions, lor 8X8fI'4lIe. do not apply to .... smaI-scaJe fishing _. namely.
~ Corlificates ConYention 1966 aM _ of C<ews (FIShermen)
Convention, 1966. 80Ih are peninen1 when we oonside! !he changing seascape of
smaI-scaJe IistWlg vesseis.
Standards 00 occupational safety and health aM social security wi! aise be part 01 !he
proposed agenda. Under !he proposed Convention and Recommendation. !he 110 also
Intends to provide protection for persons WOfkIng on both large and small fishing vessels.
This Is a welcome move, considering thaI the majority of the world's fishers wor1( In
small-scale fisheries.
ILO has circulated aquestionnaire among governments, whose replies are to be prepared
in consultation with the most representative of organizations of employers and w~ers.
The most representative fishWOf'ker organizations should engage their national labour
ministries to organize such consuttations. Tllat would be an excellent opportunity 10
participate in defining the scope 01 such astandard 00 wor!<..
The IistWlg 1IillfId ~ COfTllIex. aM ~ ~ an OO8JOUS laSk to ItunI< 01 an al-encompassjng
_ 00 _ in !he IisIing sector Iha1 appies to boOt1 _ aM smal-scaJe
_ n~. howe'Ief. impor1ant to haveSlXIl a_1ha1wi enstJt8lhat 'fishermen.
by Yirtue of lheir wOII<, do not laB 1tvoogtI!he aack of social proledion prrNllIed III olher
_. as poinI8d out by !he LO lAw aM _ report. The <:IleIJenge wi! be III
de'IeIop an We _ such a _ wi go a long way" proI8Cbng
!he _ of lhose wm labour 00 IistWlg_. boIh large- aM srnaI-scaIe. especiaIy
,,!he EEZSofothef_and!he tigh seas.Sl.<ha~ _ 00_
can also be of !18a1 support 10 fisher.; " !he BYeIl1 of capacity.-or in siIuaIions of
0'I0tlishing Iha1 <XlI.ld lead 10 rispIacement of fishers.
W. see !he proposed _ on _ in !he IisIwIg secta as an iqlortanl social
IllS1n.mentIO~fisheriesooose<Vatiooandmanagementi'ibalMlS. We..-no
this ntialive of LO.
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Gujarat
For a few rupees more
The boatworkers of Veraval in the Indian 
State of Gujarat are a harried lot, facing a bleak future
It is just a mass ofhumanity—‘suppliers’ as they arecalled—scrambling over several boats
to carry baskets of fish to the marketing
shed, or crushing ice at the crushers on the
landing site and carrying it off to the boats,
or fetching water and stores for the boat.
Some of them even look jolly, dressed up
as if to go off to the cinema, for this is their
only day at shore. Some look so young and
should be in school or playing around
rather than carrying heavy weights at the
harbour. 
In between all that movement, there are
yells, shouts and commands, in a
language that does not sound familiar—a
large bunch of these workers do not speak
Gujarati, the language of the place. Yes, it
is quite a sight, and when one gets closer
to these people, one is amazed by the
stories they tell. They are the people on
whom the fishing industry of Veraval
depends, and not a single one of
them—over 20,000 this season—has a
space of his own in this town. 
They hail from other parts of Gujarat,
mainly from Valsad, the southernmost
district of the State, and a large number of
them come from across the country, from
Andhra Pradesh on the east coast of India.
Interestingly, none of the boatworkers are
from Veraval itself.
Veraval is the largest fishing harbour of
Gujarat, which was developed in the
1960s. Traditionally, too, it was a port but
mainly for sailing vessels, large wooden
vahans which carried grain, chilli,
groundnut and, later, cement and soda
ash to Rethnagiri in Maharashtra and
Kozhikode in Kerala, and from there some
of them took spices and terracotta tiles to
the Middle East, sometimes bringing back
dates to Gujarat. It was mainly the Kharwa
community that was engaged in this
trade. The actual fishing—generally
estuarine fishing—was done by the
poorer Kharwas, using gillnets and
smaller canoes, and by Muslim fishermen
who were skilled hook-and-line and
gillnet fishermen. There were a handful of
Kharwas who used plank boats of fairly
large size (up to 32 ft) and made multiday
fishing trips with gillnets.              
In the mid-1950s, the vahans began to get
mechanized, and, by the mid-1970s, they
began to decline with the development of
roadways. Trawl fishing was launched by
the Department of Fisheries in 1962 with
the idea of demonstrating the technology.
By the mid-1960s, the government of
Gujarat had realized the need to develop
a fishing port at Veraval, as the potential
of fish export was already being
demonstrated by Maharashtra, its
southern neighbour. 
The Kharwas, whose vahans were
becoming redundant, plunged their
monies into the fishery, but not knowing
much about fishing themselves, engaged
the Valsad skippers and crew on their
boats. With the completion of the port in
1978 and with the stimulus from the
Fisheries Department and encouragement
from one enterprising exporter of Kerala
origin, who also happened to be in the
Department, the gillnets were soon
transformed into trawls, and shrimp was
the main target. 
Largely illiterate
Government subsidies were rooted
through co-operatives and were meant
only for the Kharwa community. The
community, largely illiterate, was
dependent on the Fisheries Department
and some community leaders who were
somewhat educated or had an economic
standing from the seafaring trade. 
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Here too, it was the processor whotook the lead in makingadvances to the boatowners and
this is how the actual fishing for export
commenced. It did not take long for a few
enterprising Kharwas themselves to
acquire trawlers and supply fish to the
exporter. In the initial stages, these
adventurous Kharwas acquired five to 10
trawlers, as business depended on the
size of the turnover. They also set the tone
of the industry—they were managers of
their boats. They employed crew from
other areas on a salaried basis and
regarded it as a business. Trash fish,
which easily made up half the catch, was
also in demand. In the early years, much
of it was dried and sent to the southern
States of India and even to the northeast.
By 1984, because of the presence of large
ribbonfish, the high open-bottom trawl
was introduced and Gujarat saw a new
spurt in the fish catches. 
During this phase, the poorer Kharwas
went into the fishery, taking advantage of
the government subsidies both for
acquiring boats and for diesel. Some of
these poorer Kharwas had worked on
traditional craft before, but many had
worked with the bigger Kharwar
’suppliers’ as wage labour. Seeing the
potential in the industry and the fact that
others were making big profits, they put
all they had into the industry. Instead of
getting on to the boats themselves, they
followed the others, engaging crew from
the outside, while they themselves turned
into shore managers of their boats.
Around 40 per cent of them acquired only
one boat each, which they managed
themselves or through their sons, and all
they would do would be to wait for that
boat to return after four days at sea. (This
duration has become eight to nine days
now, in 2003.)
The number of trawlers grew by leaps and
bounds between 1986 and1994. While in
1984-85, there were about 1,030 trawlers of
32-48 ft length in the district, by 1995-96
there were 4,191, which made up 58 per
cent of the trawler fleet of Gujarat. This
was also due to the liberalized export
regulations and the fact that ribbonfish
was in big demand in China at that time.
Seeing the large profits in the business,
several salaried Kharwas went into the
industry and the number of boats
increased. By 1999, there were 6,749 small
trawlers in Gujarat. The southern States of
India were already seeing the downward
slump in the fishery. Fishworkers were in
the dumps in other pats of the country and
so this growing industry in Veraval was
alluring to these workers who migrated
there and were willing to work under very
difficult conditions. 
Total workers
At the peak time of the Veraval fishery,
which was around 1998-1999, there were
about 4,000 boats, each with six workers,
which made a total of 24,000 workers
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working for eight months of the year
when the port was open. Since 1999, the
catches have fallen, and several boats
operate only for four to five months a
season. But since around 2001, one-fifth of
the fleet has not operated at all because the
boats are either too old or because the
catch per unit effort has declined so
drastically that fishing is no longer viable.
Kharwa owners who have other
occupations—several have salaried
jobs—do not find it profitable enough to
spend time managing the boats. Some of
them have also borrowed money from
their employers, which they have to
repay.
The boatworkers of Veraval rangefrom 14 to 60 years of age. Some ofthem came as experienced
fishermen but a lot of them have learnt the
ropes on the job. Gurumurthy  from
Srikakulam in Andhra came to the Kandla
port in Gujarat at the age of 13 to work as
a casual labourer, loading and unloading
goods at the harbour. He had completed
his seventh standard at school, but had to
go to work as there was no other income
in his family and he had three sisters to
look after. After working a couple of years
there, an older fishermen took him on to a
fishing boat, where he worked as a cook.
While on the boat, he learnt the work on
board and then became a boathand or
khalasi. He remembers getting typhoid
during his first boat trip, after which he
had to go home. But he returned soon after
he got well and continued to work. Some
years later, he moved to Veraval and
gradually became a tandel, the key person
among the workers. Now, for the past six
years, he has been regularly based at
Veraval, bringing with him others from
his district. Several of the deckhands tell
the same story as Gurumurthy, many
starting as cooks at very early ages and
gradually graduating to higher positions.
Despite all the hardships, for boatworkers
like Gurumurthy, life is more gainful here
than back home. Most of those who come
from Andhra are from fishing villages;
often, hundreds come from a single
fishing village. But in the case of those
from Valsad, this need not always be the
case. Several of the tandels and khalasis
have come from an agricultural
background, or had been wage workers in
construction or other fields, and have
learnt the fishing work on the job. Those
who have been traditional fishermen from
the Valsad area are called mota bhais (big
brothers), and they are probably the
best-paid too. They also have the fortune
to work on the better and bigger boats,
while the Andhra tandels get the smaller
and older boats—and lower salaries. Both
the Valsad and Andhra skippers bring
their teenage sons along, together with
their brothers and other relatives.
The tandel is the key person among the
workers. It is with him that the boatowner
makes the deal for the next season. He is
given an advance of around
Rs60,000-80,000 at the end of one season in
lieu of the next, which is four months off.
It is his job to recruit the crew, which he
does mainly from his own village, giving
each of them a small advance as well. Most
of the crew do not know exactly what they
will get for the season, but it is generally
around Rs2,000, while the tandel gets
around Rs. 8,000-9,000 a month. 
Once they take charge of a boat, this will
be their home for the next eight months.
The cabin room is the cleanest space on the
boat. This is the room dedicated by the
owner to God, and the place where the
deckhands eat and sleep. There they have
a clock and a calendar, with which they
religiously keep track of the time.
They start right away, soon after the
owner has supplied the boat with
provisions to take care of the crew’s food,
and so on. The crew does all the loading
and unloading of the material on board.
Their fishing trips are generally of eight to
nine days duration now. When they are
back in the harbour, they get exactly 24
hours to offload, reload and get to a
cinema if they can. While on the boat, they
are not allowed to consume liquor. They
use sea water to bathe and wash their
clothes. They also have to sort the fish to
some extent, to make sure the good
varieties are well preserved. The boat is
often decorated with lines on which they
dry some of the fish too. 
Sending money
The boatowner handles all the accounts.
He also sends money to the families of the
workers on their request. But settlements
are made only at the end of the season, at
which time they are at his mercy, as most
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of them are illiterate. If they feel they have
not been treated well, they do not work
for the same owner the next year. Very
few continue to work for the same owner
for more than three years. 
Some boatowners have been letdown by tandels who collect theiradvances and do not return. It has
also happened that tandels have not
received their full settlement at the end of
the season. Everything in the business
runs on trust. A worker is allowed to go
home once during the season. This is the
only time he gets to communicate with
his family and to take money home.
The Veraval harbour now has a modern
toilet facility, which is a welcome change.
The condition of the water in the harbour
itself—a dirty blue-red and
foul-smelling—could be the result of
human waste. But the workers refute this
conclusion, saying it is due to waste from
the processing plants that is released into
the harbour. 
The Veraval fishery has been built on the
sweat and toil of these boatworkers. But
for them, the future is grim—they can see
the boon gradually fading before their
own eyes, as the unmanaged fishery spins
into steady decline.
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Nalini Nayak (tvm_nalinin@
sancharnet.in), a Member of ICSF,
and A J Vijayan (ajv@protsahan.
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Fisheries agreements
Establishing a foothold
The European Union has an increasingly important role 
in the tuna fishery of the western and central Pacific Ocean
Pacific island States conduct theirfisheries policies through a numberof channels—at the national,
subregional and regional levels. The two
key bodies for co-ordinating fisheries
policy are the subregional Parties to the
Nauru Agreement (PNA) and the regional
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA). Also important in terms of
providing scientific and technical advice
(for example on stock assessments) is
another regional body, the Secretariat of
the Pacific Community.
In September 2000, Pacific island States
and distant-water fishing nations
concluded negotiations to establish an
international management and
conservation regime for the tuna fisheries
of the western and central Pacific. Among
other things, this regime (dubbed the
Tuna Commission) will seek to establish a
total allowable catch or level of fishing
effort for the region’s tuna and other
highly migratory fish stocks.
The tuna fishery of the western and central
Pacific is primarily made up of industrial
purse-seine, pole-and-line and longline
operations. These occur both in the
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Pacific
States and on the high seas. The main
species targeted by these fisheries are
skipkack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore
tuna. 
According to the Oceanic Fisheries
Program of the Pacific Community,
annual catches of the four main tuna
species have increased significantly since
1998. The total tuna catch for 2000 was
estimated at 1,862,269 tonnes. The
purse-seine fishery accounted for 56 per
cent of this total, followed by the
pole-and-line fishery (19 per cent) and the
longline fishery (12 per cent), with the
remainder (13 per cent) taken by troll gear
and a variety of other artisanal gear,
mostly in eastern Indonesia and the
Philippines.
According to preliminary estimates, the
purse-seine catch in 2001 was about
835,000 tonnes. Most of this was taken by
distant-water fleets operating in the
region, made up of 29 American, 41
Taiwanese, 35 Japanese, 27 Korean, 14
Spanish and 10 Filipino vessels—a total of
162 vessels. Domestically based
purse-seine vessels in the Pacific island
region accounted for an estimated 136,000
tonnes. The domestic fleet includes 19
vessels in Papua New Guinea (PNG), five
in the Federated States of Micronesia
(FSM), five in Marshall Islands, one in
Kiribati, two in Vanuatu and three in New
Zealand—former vessels of the United
States (US) fleet. According to FFA, in 2001,
the Spanish fleet recorded a catch of only
2,400 tonnes, a reduction of
approximately 10,000 tonnes. Only ten
vessels were licensed in 2001. 
The tuna longline catch in 2000 was about
217,000 tonnes, which was a record catch
for the region. Bigeye and yellowfin
comprised 62 per cent of the catch, while
albacore comprised 37 per cent. Most of
this catch was taken by large-vessel
distant-water fleets of Japan (216), Korea
(166) and Taiwan (149). There were 108
Chinese longliners registered on the FFA
Regional Register in the 2000-01 period.
However, there has been a significant
growth in the domestic and locally based
longline fisheries in such countries as FSM,
Fiji, Palau, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands
and Tonga.
Japanese fleet
Much of the pole-and-line catch was taken
by the Japanese distant-water fleet,
comprising 40 vessels and accounting for
about 65,000 tonnes. There are also
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domestic pole-and-line fleets in
Indonesia, Solomon Islands and French
Polynesia. The general trend, especially
for domestic operations, has been a
gradual reduction in the number of
vessels active in this fishery due to
economic factors and technological
advances in the purse-seine fishery.
Pole-and-line fleets formerly operating in
Palau, Kiribati and PNG are no longer
active.
The following summary statementson the four key tuna species wereadopted in August 2002 by the
inaugural meeting of the Scientific
Coordinating Group, which was formed
to provide scientific advice to the
Preparatory Conference for the
Commission for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the western and central Pacific.
Skipjack tuna: appears to be capable of
sustaining the current catch without
adverse effects to the overall stock.
Yellowfin tuna: the stock is likely to be
nearing full exploitation. Any increase in
fishing mortality of juveniles is likely to
move the yellowfin stock to an overfished
state.
Bigeye tuna: indications are that the stock
is nearing full exploitation. The catches
and fishing mortality of juveniles have
increased greatly over the past decade.
Any increases in juvenile fishing
mortality are likely to move the stock to
an overfished state.  
South Pacific albacore tuna: indications
are that albacore appear to be only lightly
exploited; therefore there are currently no
concerns with respect to the status of the
stock. 
These summary statements are qualified,
especially for yellowfin and bigeye tuna,
by the issue of uncertainty. This follows,
in particular, from the lack of monitoring
of purse-seine catch of juvenile yellowfin
and bigeye tuna, which tend to be
confused with skipjack tuna. A further
cause for uncertainty is the impact of
climate change, in particular El
Niño/Southern Oscillation events. This
tends to affect catch distribution and
stock abundance; however, the link
between climate variability and stock
productivity is still unclear.  
In addition to concerns about biological
limits being reached, at least for bigeye
and yellowfin, there are concerns about
economic limits being exceeded. This is
due to the problem of overcapacity and a
global oversupply of tuna, especially in
the canning market. As a result, some
vessel operators have taken steps to
reduce fishing effort in order to restrict the
supply of canning raw material and raise
prices. 
The tuna canning market improved in
2001 after several years of record low
prices for skipjack tuna. Prices recovered
in the Southeast Asian, European, Latin
American and African markets. This was
also the case—although less marked—for
yellowfin prices. However, prices for
albacore for the canning market fell
significantly. The price of pole-and-line
caught skipjack landed in Japan increased
during 2001.
Imports of fresh yellowfin into Japan from
Pacific island countries totalled more than
5,000 tonnes in 2001, an increase of 34 per
cent compared with 2000. This was mainly
due to the growth in imports from PNG
and Fiji. Japanese imports of fresh bigeye
in 2001 also increased to about 4,000
tonnes.
Most assessments suggest that there are
too many purse-seine vessels operating in
the tuna fisheries of the western and
central Pacific. The recent growth in
purse-seine capacity is due to new
entrants (such as the Spanish vessels) and
to the introduction of larger vessels. There
is also an increase in the number of locally
based vessels, with the development of
shore-based processing facilities.
Restrictions on purse-seine operations in
the eastern Pacific are thought to be
responsible for the growth of Spanish
interest in fishing in the western and
central Pacific. 
Excessive fleet
The number of purse-seine vessels active
in the region is considered excessive from
both a conservation and economic point of
view. This is despite a regional
arrangement to limit the number of
purse-seine vessels licensed by Pacific
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island States (the Palau Arrangement) and
despite a steady reduction in the number
of US vessels operating in the western
Pacific. Studies to date have shown that
the profitability of the purse-seine and
longline fishery could be greatly increased
by reducing purse-seine fishing effort. A
20 per cent reduction in purse-seine effort,
for example, would double the
profitability of the fishery by improving
catch rates. The impact of purse-seine
fishing through use of deeper nets and
free-floating fish aggregating devices
(FADs) is also considered responsible for
the falling longline catch rates for bigeye
tuna in the western and central Pacific.
There has recently been increasedinterest by offshore investors inestablishing tuna loining plants in
the region. Domestic or locally based
vessels are expected to supply these
plants. This may put more pressure on
increasing the number of licenses
available for such vessels and staying
within the limits set under the Palau
Arrangement. Member States of the Palau
Arrangement are at present considering a
proposal to limit purse-seine fishing days
rather than allocate a certain number of
licences to various flag States. 
Japan is the largest distant-water fishing
nation in the region (active in all three
major fisheries). It also has the longest
established fishing presence in the region.
Japan has bilateral fishing agreements
with eight Pacific island States. These are
predominantly rollover types of
agreements comprising a head agreement
between the governments and subsidiary
government to industry agreements. It is
the subsidiary agreements that determine
the rate of return and other conditions of
fishing. Access fees are paid on a per trip
basis wholly by the Japanese fishing
industry. However, the Japanese
government provides fisheries grant aid
and technical co-operation as an indirect
subsidy (or top-up) to the access fee. The
access fee is on average about 5 per cent of
the catch value, using the previous three
years catch to calculate the fee level.
Almost all Japanese-caught tuna is landed
in Japan. 
Bilateral agreements also exist between
Pacific island countries and fleets from
Taiwan and Korea. Fees are based on the
catch and prices for the previous year and
by applying the target rate of return (five
or six per cent of the value of the catch).
Taiwan, which has the second largest fleet
presence in the region, has diplomatic ties
with only four Pacific island States
(Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Marshall
Islands and Palau). 
Access agreements
Thus, access agreements tend to be
between the coastal State government and
fisheries associations. Taiwan is the one
distant-water fishing nation actively
expanding its fleet, both longline and
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purse-seine. However, it has been the
most difficult fleet to control and
regulate. Taiwanese and Korean fleets
offload their purse-seine catch to
canneries in Fiji and American Samoa.
Other catch is transshipped at Pacific
island ports for the fresh-and frozen-tuna
markets. 
The US is the only distant-waterfishing nation to have amultilateral fisheries access
arrangement in the region. This is
between the US government and the
member States of the FFA and was first
concluded in 1987. Recent negotiations
saw the extension of the treaty for an
additional ten-year period (to June 2013).
The US fleet (purse-seine only) lands
almost all its catch in American Samoa for
processing in the two US canneries located
there.
In exchange for access, the US tuna
industry pays US$4 mn per year as licence
fees (to the Pacific island parties). The US
government provides US$14 mn annually
under an associated Economic Assistance
Agreement. Of this total package, about
85 per cent is allocated to countries
according to catch volume within various
EEZs. The remaining 15 per cent is
apportioned equally to all parties
irrespective of catch in the form of project
aid and technical assistance.
In July 2002, a bilateral agreement was
concluded between the EU and Kiribati.
This followed a bilateral agreement
concluded in late 1999 between Kiribati
and a Spanish industry group. It is
expected that the European-flagged
vessels operating under the industry
agreement will in future operate under
the EU agreement (since it provides
generous concessions to the industry). 
The agreement is initially for three years
and allows purse-seine and longline
vessels to operate in the Kiribati EEZ. For
the immediate future, it is likely that only
purse-seiners will fish under the
agreement. The agreement is heavily
subsidized by an EU financial
contribution (set at Euro 546,000 for the
first year, corresponding to 8,400 tonnes
of tuna). Approximately 19 per cent of
this contribution will be allocated to
‘targeted measures’ to support Kiribati
participation in fisheries organizations
and its institutional capacity. 
Until the mid-1990s, the only EU
involvement in regional fisheries was
through regional funding programmes,
for example the South Pacific Marine
Resources Development Programme
funded under the European Development
Fund. While the EU provided important
assistance, the relationship was not
without problems. For example, in 1996,
differences between the EU and the
member States of the FFA led to the
termination of a financing agreement
under which the EU was to have funded a
regional surveillance programme and a
position in the FFA. 
The prospect of a fisheries agreement
between the Pacific island States and the
EU was first mooted in 1997. It was first
discussed within the regional fisheries
forums (FFA and PNA) in 1998. Two
developments at that time are likely to
have had an important influence on the
timing. The first was the move taken in
mid-1997 by Pacific island States and
distant-water fishing nations to begin
negotiations towards establishing a
management regime for the region’s tuna
stocks, in line with recent developments in
international law of the sea. This was
known as the Multilateral High-Level
Conference (or MHLC process). It is likely
that the EU (particularly Spain) was keen
to establish a foothold in the region and
establish a ‘real interest’ in the Pacific’s
tuna fishery in anticipation of the fishery
becoming subject to an international
management and conservation regime.
The second development at that time was
the beginning of negotiations for a
successor to the Fourth Lomé Convention
between the EU and the African,
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of
nations. It seems that there was a view
among Pacific island trade officials that a
link should be drawn between fisheries
access and post-Lomé trade and
development co-operation. 
Links rejected
Their strategy may have been to use the
lure of fishing access to secure a more
favorable outcome for the region in the
negotiations with EU. However any link
between fishing access and the post-Lomé
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negotiations was emphatically rejected by
Pacific island fisheries policymakers in
their meetings in 1998 and 1999.  
Much of the discussion on the EUfishing interests in the region bythe Forum Fisheries Committee
(FFC, the governing council of the FFA)
centred on the possible impact of such an
agreement on EU funding arrangements in
the region. 
Officials were especially concerned about
possible linkage between fisheries access
and the negotiations for a successor to the
Lomé Convention. There were also
questions raised about the EU’s
commitment to the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, given that the EU had entered
reservations regarding the high-seas
boarding and inspection provisions. 
Overall, there was a reluctance to enter
into an access arrangement with the EU at
this time as it would possibly provide a
pretext for full participation of the EU in
the MHLC process. Forum island countries
were generally averse to opening up the
MHLC process to newcomers who did not
have an established fishing presence in the
region. 
They were also wary about the EU, given
its reputed behavior in other regional
fisheries management organizations and
reputation for poor compliance in many
fisheries arrangements.
At the fourth session of the MHLC process
in Honolulu in February 1999, the EU was
formally admitted as an observer.
Meanwhile, the FFC succeeded in getting
the MHLC to adopt a resolution “calling on
all States and entities to exercise
reasonable restraint in respect of any
regional expansion of fishing effort and
capacity”. This resolution was followed
up at the fifth session of the MHLC in
September 1999 by an even stronger
stand. The Conference, “noting the
advanced stage of negotiations towards a
Convention...” decided not to increase the
number of new participants in the MHLC
process. Nor would new members be
admitted until after the convention
entered into force. This would preclude
the EU from membership of the interim
regime to be established following the
adoption of the convention. 
Despite these resolutions, Kiribati
concluded an agreement with a Spanish
fishing company OPAGAC—the first such
agreement with a European fishing fleet.
Under this agreement, 14 purse-seine
vessels would have access to Kiribati
waters for a period of 12 months from
October 1999. 
Interim regime
In the lead-up to the sixth and penultimate
round of the MHLC in April 2000, the EU
made a strong bid for full membership of
the interim regime. It made its claim on the
grounds that the EU was a full contracting
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party of other regional fisheries
organizations and that flag vessels of the
EU were already fishing in the area to be
covered by the convention. 
The issue of EU membership of theinterim regime provoked heateddebate at both the sixth MHLC and
the FFC meeting convened on the
sidelines. In a strongly worded statement
to the conference, the FFC group
reaffirmed their support for the
moratorium on new members that was
adopted at the previous session.
The EU decided to abandon the idea of a
multilateral approach to fisheries access
in the Pacific region, deciding instead to
pursue bilateral access agreements with
certain island States. 
Letters were sent in late 1999 to six FFA
member States, seeking to formalize EU
interest in bilateral fisheries access. 
Positive responses were received by all
(except Marshall Islands) and
exploratory talks were held with Kiribati
in late March 2000. 
At the same time, France, through its
territories, also pursued discussions with
PNG and Solomon Islands on possible
access arrangements and a
Memorandum of Understanding
establishing a framework for access was
signed with PNG in mid-2000. This would
allow purse-seine vessels access to its
waters.
At the seventh and final session of the
MHLC process in September 2000, the
Convention for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish in
the western and central Pacific was
formally adopted. A resolution
establishing a preparatory conference, to
lay the groundwork for the new regime
that would be established once the
convention entered into force, was also
adopted. As expected, this resolution
restricted full membership to those States
and entities that had participated as full
members in the MHLC process. Perhaps as
a sign of its disapproval, the EU was not
present at this final session.
The first session of the Preparatory
Conference (PrepCon 1) was convened in
New Zealand in April 2001. In advance of
this meeting, the EU again sought to
participate as a full member. In requesting
full membership, the EU stressed the
contribution that it had made to regional
tuna assessment programmes. Some FFC
members (for example, Kiribati) were by
now sympathetic to this EU request, and
willing to support full EU membership.
But there remained strong reservations
from a number of others.
The second session of the PrepCon was
convened by PNG in February 2002. This
meeting was immediately preceded by an
informal consultation on “mechanisms to
promote participation”. The informal
consultation spent most time addressing
the issue of EU participation. Once again,
the EU had written in advance of the
meeting stating its case for admission as a
full participant to the PrepCon process.
Once again, it emphasized its support for
the development of the Pacific island
States, in fisheries and in other fields.
According to the EU head of delegation,
this support and commitment
“distinguishes (the EU) from other
potential aspirants for membership of the
PrepCon”.
Issue debated
The issue of EU participation was debated
at length in the FFC meeting held prior to
PrepCon 2. The focus of discussion was a
US proposal that would allow the EU a seat
at the table of PrepCon (hence full rights
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to contribute to the proceedings), while
retaining its status as an observer. It
would not be able to accede to the
convention until its entry into force, nor
have voting rights within the PrepCon. 
While there remainedreservations about setting aprecedent for others to follow,
there was also some support for the US
proposal as it applied to the EU, especially
as the EU had pledged in its letter to the
PrepCon not to support a reopening of the
convention text. On these grounds, the EU
was allowed a seat at the table and it
participated fully in the deliberations of
PrepCon 2.
This development may be regarded as a
political victory for the EU. It signalled a
major elevation in its status within the
PrepCon process. It also reflected an
improvement in its relations with
PrepCon members compared to the
previous session, when it was viewed
with some scepticism, if not suspicion
especially by some members of the FFC.
The conclusion in July 2002 of an access
agreement between Kiribati and the EU
had immediate consequences for the
allocation of purse-seine licences under
the Palau Arrangement. The agreement
provides for a minimum of six
purse-seiners and a maximum of 11
purse-seiners. Given that the EU now has
an allocation under the Palau
Arrangement (albeit a very small one), it
is possible for the EU to conclude access
agreements with other Pacific island
countries. However, it would be required
to use the same vessels as licensed under
the Kiribati agreement in order to comply
with the Palau Arrangement. This may
change if there is a further reduction of the
US fleet (freeing up more licenses) or a shift
to allocation by fishing days and not by
flag.
There appears to be interest among a
number of other Pacific island countries in
concluding access agreements with the EU.
This reflects a desire by countries to
increase revenue from access fees but also
to facilitate domestic industry
development. The perception among
some fisheries officials in the region is that
the terms of the Kiribati agreement are
better than those of other bilateral
partners, in terms of access fees and the
potential for development of shore-based
facilities and fishing capacity. The Kiribati
agreement also provides for the
employment of local seamen on the EU
vessels.
The Kiribati access agreement has been
hailed as a model fishing agreement by EU
officials, as it is based on principles of
sustainability and good governance. The
agreement meets the various regional
minimum terms and conditions of access
(including observer coverage and use of a
vessel monitoring system). It is also
claimed that the Kiribati agreement has a
strong scientific review base, using
regional scientific advice and stock
assessment.
Beyond these positive assessments, there
are broader considerations that arise from
the formal entry of the EU into the western
and central Pacific fishery. This includes
the economic impact of increased fleet
capacity, especially of the purse-seine
fleet. Any benefits that may have been
derived from a reduction of the US
purse-seine fleet have been offset by the EU
vessels and other new entrants. This
underscores the weakness of existing
regional regimes to effectively control the
size of the purse-seine fishery and the
competing pressures on Pacific island
States (to maximize revenue while
conserving the stocks). The failure to
negotiate a multilateral access agreement
with the EU was in part due to competing
national interests among Pacific island
States and a reluctance to ‘give up’
potential benefits from bilateral
agreements. Similarly, the failure to
realize significant gains in domestic
industry development in Pacific island
States (and domestic basing of fleets) may,
in part, be attributed to the incentives that
island States continue to give foreign
offshore fishing arrangements.
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Fisheries management
A social contract for fisheries?
The level of conflict among fishermen in Norway 
would seem to call for a social contract for the fishery 
I come from an area in Norway—farnorth of the Arctic Circle—where themost important industry was always
fisheries. We would not have been able to
sustain ourselves and to live as
comfortably as we did, if it hadn’t been
for the fishery and our marine resources.
In fact, it is the riches of the ocean,
combined with the free and easy access,
that explain the dispersed settlement
structure along the northern coast of
Norway. What happened with the fishery
had a crucial impact on our economy, on
our communities and our way of life. Due
to the Gulf Stream we are, in spite of the
Arctic location, blessed with mild
temperatures, and, due to the easily
available fish resource, we never starved.
These days we exploit other things from
our waters—oil, for example. But the oil
is not what we eat. In the north, where I
live, the oil industry does not provide
many jobs either. During the last 25 years,
salmon aquaculture has gained
importance, but still, it cannot replace the
capture fisheries; the cod, the herring, the
shrimp, the saithe, the haddock, the
capelin and the mackerel that we harvest,
process, and—in the case of 95 per cent of
the total catch—export. The expectation
is, though, that aquaculture will become
increasingly important for our regional
and national economy. There is now also
an enormous optimism with regard to the
new marine biotech industry. 
The optimism is only matched by the
pessimism that for the time being reigns
in the traditional capture fisheries, where
one crisis somewhere in the system is
followed by another crisis somewhere
else. At present, we’re down. Now it is the
situation with the cod in the North Sea
and the strong Norwegian currency that
creates worries. In the early 1990s, we had
a severe resource crisis with the cod in the
Barents Sea. Since then, there have been
ups and downs.  
Norway’s fisheries have traditionally
been free and open. It was possible for
everyone to start a career in the fisheries.
The crisis that hit the cod fishery in 1990
eliminated that freedom—probably
forever. Before 1990, we had a quota and
a licensing system for the offshore,
large-scale fleet, whereas the inshore,
small-scale fishery was subject to few
restrictions. But in 1990, the government
suddenly had a severe problem on its
hands and had to do something rapidly
and drastically. The coastal fisheries were
transformed from open-access to closed.
Today, 95 per cent of the fishery is subject
to quota management. Now a young
person, in order to establish himself as a
fisherman (in Norway a fisher is almost
always a he), must not only afford a boat,
but he must also have the financial muscle
to buy a quota. And quotas are currently
very expensive, if indeed available at all.  
These days a fisherman must also live
with a heavy battery of rules and
regulations that confront him every day
he goes out to fish. He also faces a control
and inspection system on the fishing
grounds as well as when he lands his fish.
This is a system that works on the
assumption that he is a potential felon
who would do everything he can to cheat.
For a young fisherman, this has always
been a fact of life.  
Management system
For those who were recruited into the
fishery in the 1970s and the 1980s,
however, the change that has happened in
the 1990s is breathtaking. The new
management system was not introduced
overnight. It has taken more than 10 years
to build it. Gradually, new rules were
added.   Also, more and more resources
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were spent on enforcement, which, of
course, revealed more violations, or even
triggered them. The outcome of this
vicious circle is a management system so
complex that fishermen complain that
they risk breaking rules they never knew
existed. 
It should be added, though, that muchof this management system was notimposed on the fishermen. In many
instances, they asked for it.  Rules
pertaining to the fishing operations have
resulted from demands from the
fishermen themselves, often from one
group of fishermen who wanted some
form of protection against another group,
for instance, a group that fish with a
different type of gear. I am sure that this
kind of dynamics is not unique to
Norway. The quota system was
controversial when it was introduced. It
was accepted as a preliminary measure
that would be abolished once the cod
stock was back to normal. The cod stock
recovered in the mid-1990s, but the quota
system remained without much protest
from the fishermen. Today, there are few
in the industry who want to get rid of it.
Changes, yes, but removal, no.
It is a notable fact that Norwegian
fishermen, through their national
association, are fairly well organized and
are, therefore, also highly active and
involved in fisheries policy-making
including resource management. They are
in a position to influence the management
system and rules put in place.
Traditionally, fishermen in Norway were
able to speak with one voice. Today,
however, there is much more
disagreement among them. The national
fishermen’s association has, for some
years now, been on the brink of collapse
due to internal strife. The large-scale
vessel-owners have repeatedly threatened
to break out. Many small-scale fishermen,
those that fish close to shore and with
traditional gear, did so in the early 1990s,
and formed their own association, The
Norwegian Coastal Fishermen’s
Association.  Its membership has been
growing ever since.
The national fishermen’s association is, in
reality, a federation of suborganizations of
different gear groups and regional
associations. (The Coastal Fishermen’s
Association does not belong here.) It used
to be able to strike agreements and reach
consensus on important political and legal
issues. The quota system introduced in
1990 has changed all that. The fishermen
as a group have, therefore, lost much of
their power in Norwegian fisheries  as
compared to processing and aquaculture.
Fewer numbers
It has not helped Norway’s fishermen, of
course, that they are getting fewer and
fewer in numbers. In 1950, they were
100,000; today they are 14,000 and their
number will most likely continue to drop.
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This makes fishermen less of a force in
Norwegian politics. One should perhaps
expect that it would make them
more—and not less—united. Instead, the
level of conflict among fishermen has
increased. The reason has much to do
with the fish resources becoming
increasingly scarce. I would argue,
however, that the quota system itself
must take much of the blame. When fish
quotas become a privately held right—as
is largely the case with the Norwegian
system—unavoidably it creates a system
of privilege. Winners will, of course,
support the system, while the losers will
condemn it. 
In Norway, quotas are attached to thevessel; thus, the quota inflates theprice of the vessel dramatically when
it is sold. Since vessels are freely bought
and sold, so also are quota rights. Such a
system is bound to have an effect on the
structure of the industry. In essence, this
is also what the system aims at. But it
benefits those who can muster enough
capital. In our situation, the large-scale
operators in the southwestern part of the
county come out as winners, while
smaller operators who dominate in the
northern fishing communities are losing
out. We see, therefore, a geographical
concentration of fishing capacity and
quota rights that is threatening the
existence of many fisheries-dependent
communities. Conflicts in Norwegian
fisheries thus also have a regional
dimension.
This is not a unique situation for Norway.
It is happening everywhere where quotas
are bought and sold. Iceland has gone
farther than Norway and other
Scandinavian countries in introducing a
system that turns fishing quotas into a
market commodity. This has changed the
Icelandic fishery and has concentrated
fishing rights in fewer hands. It has
transformed the nature of fishing, the
relations between fishermen, and
between the fleet and the processing
sector. It has altered the very meaning of
being a fisherman.  Some see this as not
only inevitable, but also as commendable.
No doubt, there is too much fishing
capacity out there. Many problems
would have been solved if this capacity
were reduced.  Individual transferable
quotas (ITQs) may be a means of obtaining
such a goal. But the downscaling also has
social and cultural consequences that can
be quite dramatic. Iceland is a good
illustration, and Norway is not a bad one
either. No wonder, therefore, that a quota
system that allows the market to
determine who will prevail in this
industry is controversial. Currently, the
issue is burning hot in Denmark.
In 1994, the Fishermen’s Association
agreed on an allocation key between the
large-scale, ocean-going fishing fleet and
the coastal, small-scale fishing fleet
regarding the cod stock, leaving the
former group with 35 per cent of the total
allowable catch (TAC).  It was also agreed
that when the TAC is low, the coastal fleet
should have a higher percentage than
when it is high. Later, other species were
included. 
In 2001, a long-term allocation key for
most species was agreed upon, which
gives specific groups of vessels a fixed
share of all TACs. In many ways, this is
remarkable. First, it is a rather fragile
compromise among groups of fishermen
who have conflicting interests pertaining
to quota allocation, but who share the
view that it is their responsibility to arrive
at a workable agreement.  Second, the
government has accepted the deal
without objections. 
In 2002, for example, the Fisheries
Minister proclaimed that he would not
alter the arrangement one iota but stick to
the key agreed by the partners involved.
He was heavily criticized in the media for
abstaining to intervene in such an
important issue of distribution. One may,
of course, question whether that was a
sensible thing to do for a fisheries minister
who is ultimately responsible for all
aspects of fisheries.  
Greater trust
Nevertheless, it can be interpreted as a real
devolution of management authority,
signalling a great level of trust in the
organization’s ability to act responsibly.
(There is, of course, a less flattering
interpretation: the minister—and the
political system—finds it politically
convenient to leave controversial issues of
public concern to the parties involved.
Political opportunism, rather than
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genuine devolution, is thus perhaps the
name of the game.) 
Whether the agreement willcontinue to receive supportamong the fishermen and the
government in the future remains to be
seen. If it does not survive, fishermen may
become even more divided than they are
today. If conflict cannot be avoided, it is
better to have the fishermen fighting one
another each time the allocation key is
renegotiated than having them fighting all
the time. Bringing fishermen into a
responsible partnership may also allow
them to break out of the role of the villain
that the current management system
places them in. No voluntary
organization, such as the Norwegian
Fishermen’s Association, can survive
conflicts that are never addressed and
resolved in an orderly fashion.  
Our management system depends on
such an organization. Both the fishermen
and the government need it. In fact, it was
the government, which, in the late 1920s,
took the initiative to form the
organization. The government needed
someone in the fishery to deal with who
could speak on behalf of all the fishermen.
The fact that the fishermen were able to
unite has since then been an important
precondition for their power in
Norwegian fisheries. When the crisis hit in
1990, the government had a representative
voice of the fishermen that it could listen
to and seek advice from. The apparatus for
negotiation was already in place. The two
parties did not first have to establish a
working relationship before they could
start to address the crisis.  
Fisheries management cannot be focused
on one thing only—for instance, economic
efficiency. There are many other concerns
involved and we need to address them in
ways that do not alienate those who have
most at stake—those whose lives are
dependent on both healthy fish stocks and
healthy fishing communities. The issues
are of such a nature that we need to
thoroughly debate what to do.  When
things are complex, diverse and dynamic,
we need to be flexible. Our convictions are
constantly challenged by new events, and
we cannot be dogmatic as to solutions.
Instead, our perspective must be broad
and inclusive.
Importantly also, we must be able to learn
from experience, to learn from each other
and debate what we learn, because we
never learn the same things from what we
experience. 
Different conclusions
In Norway, we still debate what we
learned from the fisheries crisis of the
early 1990s, and typically, people draw
very different conclusions.  There are
those who argue that we didn’t learn a
thing. When the crisis was over, we went
back to the old habits. Therefore, perhaps,
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history is bound to repeat itself. This is
something we can hardly afford. Norway
certainly cannot permit a new decimation
of the herring stock, as happened in the
late 1960s. It took 30 years to rebuild it.
Neither can we allow another Barents Sea
cod crisis as we had in the early 1990s. 
We have to learn to live with thefact that conditions in thefishery will remain unstable
and that there will always be a crisis
somewhere in the fishery. But if we ask
ourselves what this means, what
conclusions we can draw from this fact
pertaining to fisheries management, what
then would be our answer? How do we
deal with all the complexities, diversity
and dynamics that the fishing industry
must somehow relate to? Do we build an
equally complex, diverse and dynamic
management system? 
The Norwegian experience is that there
are limits to complexity. We need to turn
the trend around, and make the
management system simpler.  But how
do we do it, given the fact that (a) the
industry, and the environment in which
it finds itself, is characterized by
increasing globalization; and (b) that
fisheries management must address
several concerns that are frequently in
conflict and cannot be easily reconciled.
There are no simple answers to these
questions. But I do think the allocation
key contract in the Norwegian fishery,
negotiated among the fishermen
themselves and with the government as
facilitator, may provide some clues.
Much would be gained if we could
somehow arrive at a social contract for the
fishery—a general agreement among
those involved about what we, as a
collective, want to accomplish and what
we must avoid. Those for whom the
fishery is a matter of life or death must be
involved in deliberating and deciding on
what such a social contract should
contain.  Today, the allocation key
pertains only to quota shares between
inshore and offshore. The contract should
also be extended to include other
contentious issues, such as the allocation
between regions, and between onshore
and offshore activities, and between
existing and future generations. A
contract should also specify who should
be considered as stakeholders with a
legitimate claim to be represented in
decision-making forums. 
Importantly, a social contract for the
fishery cannot be imposed from the top
down. Instead, we must build on
democratic principles, where all affected
stakeholders must be allowed to voice
their concerns. Only through such a
contract can issues of social justice inform
the decision-making process. Far too
often, concerns of social justice are
suppressed, while fisheries management
is reduced to a technical fix. No wonder,
therefore, that fisheries management
continues to be among the most
contentious areas of public policy, where
lack of legitimacy is turning management
into an increasingly repressive affair.
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Fisheries management
Hijacked by neoliberal economics
A fashionable neoclassical political-economic 
ideology has taken over the management of many fisheries
In the beginning, fish were aplenty andthere were no rules upon the face ofthe deep, and the spirit of free access
moved upon the waters. And the
fishermen saw that it was good and fished
as many fishes as they needed to feed their
families and their neighbours.  But people
were multiplying and replenishing the
earth, and more and more fishermen had
to catch more and more fish to meet the
demand of the ever-growing humanity.
And governments said: let there be
management, so that there would always
be enough fish left in the seas to procreate.
And they limited the gear, the vessels, the
seasons, and the fishing areas, and they
called it ‘input regulation’. But, the
fishermen kept fishing and their fleets
kept growing, and the governments saw
that it was bad. So they made licences, and
their scientist thought up the maximum
sustainable yield (MSY) and the total
allowable catches (TACs). But the
fishermen kept competing, and
over-capitalizing, and the fish became
scarce. And the economists said unto the
governments: let there be property rights.
And they spawned individual
transferable quotas (ITQs). And they
believed that it is good and said unto the
fishermen: Behold, rights’ privatization is
your salvation. And the governments sent
the ITQs upon waters to replenish the seas
and subdue all fisheries. And it was good!
This is more or less the gospel, which
prevails throughout fisheries
administrations in many countries. It
makes some people richer and they
become its devoted believers and
supporters, while the many made
poorer—or afraid to become so—its
adamant opponents. And the
consequences in almost every single case
are more or less gradual concentration of
fishing rights in fewer and fewer hands,
often enough in the hands of major
corporate interests, at the expense of
small-scale, family- and skipper-owned
fishing enterprises that operate one or two
small or even medium-sized fishing
vessels, each. 
Fisheries management is supposed to look
after the health of the fish resources
exploited by fishermen. This requires
knowledge of fishery biology and
ecology, population dynamics, and
historical data of the fishery and of
environmental and associated stock
fluctuations in its area. As fisheries
management can only manage people, it
entails negotiations, legislation,
technology and enforcement. There is a
whole catalogue of management systems
and technical and administrative methods
that managers can use to try to achieve
their targets. The political attitude of the
powers in charge determines the choice of
the system and the manner in which it is
applied through licensing, quotas
allocation, or limits set on effort. The
system chosen influences, through
allocating benefits to the different
stakeholders, the distribution of the
benefits derived from the resource. For
example, allocating fishing rights to a
large number of small-scale fishermen
would call for different management
methods than allocating them to a large
company.
Traditional knowledge
Old-type management by tribal and
community leaders and local fisherfolk’s
organizations based on traditional
knowledge of the resource and traditional
justice, is now almost totally extinct. It has
been replaced throughout most of the
world by bureaucratic and technocratic
mechanisms heavily influenced by
political and economic considerations
that, while interested in fish as marketable
merchandise and a source of profits to the
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operators, have only little to do with
safeguarding the resource as a source of
income to fishing people. Fisheries
management has thus become a power
play over benefits from the resource.
Stakeholders are many, starting with
fishing people and local interests in
fishing communities, through
recreational fishermen, environmental
lobbies and coastal development
interests, and ending with powerful
corporations and market forces, whether
local, national or multinational. 
Neoclassical economics invadedthe management of variouscommons and national resources
as an extension of a paradigm
dominant—though very much at
issue—in the industrialized world. Its
gospel is being spread over the world and
its political, financial and academic
institutions by troops of disciplined
economists, rewarded for devotion, and
punished for dissent. So, what is this
neoliberal or neoclassical teaching in
economics that has also impinged on
fisheries? And on what basis are its
devoted adherents preaching that theirs
is the only way society can take to utilize
its fish resources in a feasible and efficient
manner? 
The old ‘classical’ economic teaching
introduced the belief in the ‘invisible
hand’ driven by self-interest guiding
rational individual decisions eventually
into an optimum economy, in which
free-market forces take care of all aspects
of peoples’  lives.  An implied outcome of
such ‘free play’ is that any financial profit
derived from a common, fully, partly or
quasi-privatized resource would
somehow trickle down and redistribute
itself all over the society. But this is a myth
and a fallacious contention, if not an
outright lie. It is common knowledge that,
in most of the world’s countries, a big
share of such benefits indeed trickles
down, but to various investments abroad,
and to imported luxury products and
services. The ‘trickle-down’ theory can
approach the real situation only in a few
rich countries, where profits feel secure
and investments promise further
accumulation of capital.  
Recently, more and more economists and
other social scientists have started casting
doubts on the neoclassical gospel,
nicknamed by some as ’autistic
economics’.  Awarding the 2002 Nobel
Price in economics to two professors, one
of them a psychologist, who refuted the
theory that, as a rule, individuals make
rational economic decisions, reflected this
growing criticism. Economic determinism
inherent in the neoliberal theory does not
work; the markets’ reaction to prices, the
prices’ reaction to the dynamics of supply
and demand, and peoples’ reactions and
economic activities do not fit that theory’s
assumptions. Hence, its weakness in
economic analysis and forecasting.
Some economists and other social
scientists argue that, contrary to its
pretense to a scientific, objective
approach, neoclassical economics is, in
fact, a social-political narrative and a
methodology used by global economic
and political interests to concentrate
power in the hands of corporate national
and multinational institutions. Thus,
individual businessmen and small and
medium-scale private enterprises, not to
speak of wage earners, are losing their
influence on socioeconomic decision
making to powerful
commercial-industrial centres and their
collaborators in governments. This
transfer of power is promoted, legislated,
and executed through democratic
processes occurring within the existing
legal framework with the help of
well-financed journalistic and media
campaigns and more or less biased
scientific publications, with the
neoclassical economic narrative serving as
a tool for achieving the explicit goals and
hidden agendas of its promoters. Thus,
the ‘invisible hand’ has been transformed
from the sum of the multitude of
individual decisions into the sum of the
political and economic decisions of
powerful interests. 
Profit maximization
Neoclassical economics is supposed to
aim at and produce maximization of social
and national benefits, which, in fact, are
dollar-equivalent measures of how
economists value goods and services
(including non-market goods and
services). It preaches maximization of
profits or rents often attained at the
expense of heavy social costs. The big
question is how these costs and benefits
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are defined and calculated; since social
costs are very difficult to estimate, any
portrayal of economics as an absolute,
scientific methodology is simply
fallacious, and honest economists admit
that they cannot adequately calculate all
social benefits and all social costs. 
It is obvious that losses incurredthrough forfeiture of alternativeactions, and due to various social and
other external costs, many of which
cannot be evaluated in terms of dollars
and cents, are a part and parcel of any
economy. As long as we do not take into
account all the costs and benefits from
production and market fluctuations,
various management steps, social,
economic and cultural dislocations of
people and their ramifications affecting
coastal communities, as well as other
’externalities’ difficult to express in
monetary terms, we are unable to
calculate the true net social costs and
benefits.  
Also, many people associate the term
’social benefits’ with how national
resources are distributed across society.
They ask, for example, how many people
make a living from a certain resource. A
’less efficient’ small-scale fishery that
employs many more people than an
’efficient’ big-owner fleet, may feed less
monies to the ’national purse’, but, as a
rule, is directly and effectively more
beneficial to people and their
communities. Only an in-depth analysis
can establish which option would
produce truer benefits and values. Thus, it
is quite consequential who defines
national and social benefits, and how.
For example, calculation of net national
benefits for an industrial shrimp fishery in
a non-industrial country must include a
deduction of the costs of all imports, such
as expatriate manpower, fuel and
lubricants, vessels, deck and propulsion
machinery, processing and refrigeration
equipment, and fishing gear, as well as
insurance and maintenance costs incurred
in foreign-currency. In some cases, the
only net benefits from an industrial
shrimp fishery in such countries are the
revenues from licence fees and the
employment of nationals, while the major
share of the revenues as well as the
product itself goes abroad.
Policy costs
Therefore, responsible economic theory
must take into account also values that are
non-financial/commercial, and the
diverse peripheral socioeconomic,
political and cultural costs, as well as the
taxpayer’s money spent on dealing with
human problems resulting from
management decisions. Only then would
the society and its governments be
informed of the true costs of any policy
proposition, before their natural resources
get transferred into the hands of a few.
Nowadays, however, such transfer is
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facilitated by governments’ obsession
with privatization as a panacea for all
maladies of the economy. 
The neoliberal gospel preaches thatpractically nothing can workefficiently, if it is not somebody’s
private or corporate property. The
massive ideological privatization
practised in some countries has embraced
also such natural resources as water,
forests and various energy sources as well
as public transport. Even economically
viable, and efficiently run national
resources often fall victim to the
privatization Moloch. How wrong this
ideology can be has been recently well
illustrated by a whole series of flops of
some mammoth privatized and corporate
companies, due to both, mismanagement
and corruption, as well as by the rather
disappointing results of the privatization
of the British railway system. Swissair,
PanAm, Enron and other recent bankrupt
giants were not run by governments. 
One consequence of the domination of
neoclassical economics is the rather
obscure struggle between free enterprise
and corporate interests.  In the past, the
conception of capitalism and free markets
used to emphasize private initiative.
Nowadays, however, it isn’t necessarily
so. Neoclassical economics is leading to a
regime in which major businesses and
corporations are gradually displacing
smaller-scale enterprises and
businessmen, while being indifferent
towards the social conditions of working
people, whose role it reduces to selling
their work power on the market. It is
‘happy’ when supply of labour exceeds
demand, because unemployment
depresses wages and improves profits. 
Some time ago, after the demise of the
Soviet system, one would think that free
enterprise had won. One is not so sure
nowadays. Like the Soviet monopolistic
concerns, some of the giant companies of
the ‘capitalist’ world are run by financial
bureaucracies supported by ideological
economists, who seem to consider small
and family-owned enterprises a noise
and a nuisance in their concept of
‘economically efficient’ world.
The invasion of fisheries by neoclassical
economics has been a logical
consequence to its domination of the
global, and many national economies.
Like many historical invasions, it was
partly invited from inside the fisheries by
large-scale interests and their proxies in
the management mechanisms, who gave
it a friendly reception. Once in, it seems to
be here to stay, especially in all those
countries where, for various reasons, it is
not met with strong opposition.
What brought this ideology into the
fisheries is its claim that privatization is
the most efficient, if not the only, mode of
exploiting a resource. This, even if the
resource belongs to the whole nation, as is
the case with water, forests and, for that
matter, fish in the sea. 
When, following the Second World War,
the spiralling growth of fisheries brought
about the need for management, it was
initially based on so-called ‘input control’.
This implies regulation of fishing effort
through such means as limited access,
fishing time and areas, as well as other
regulations that try to follow the
biological characteristics of the species
involved. In some countries this
management system still works well
enough; in others it has been deemed,
rightly or wrongly, inadequate. Fish
population dynamics models have been
used to estimate the biomass of fish
populations and, consequently, the fixing
of TACs. In some fisheries this led to highly
competitive ‘gold rush’ fishing operations
and investment in excessively strong and
fast vessels. The next step was dividing
the TAC into quotas that were allocated to
vessels, usually, according to their fishing
history. And this was the moment when
the neoliberal economists stepped in with
a new pattern: marketable fishing quotas
(ITQs).
Property rights
They introduced the rather axiomatic
theory that property rights are a must in
fisheries for maximum benefit and
efficiency, spelled out in financial terms
and rational exploitation of the resource.
Since property rights are characterized by
(i) security, or quality of title; (ii)
exclusivity; (iii) permanence; and (iv)
transferability, their application in
fisheries boils down to ITQs. Thus, mere
‘fishing rights’ have become ‘private
property rights’.  Trade in fishing rights
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eventually must hit the weaker
stakeholder by allocating individual
quotas too small to pay a vessel owner’s
way out of the red, on the one hand, and
by pricing licences and quota entitlements
above the value of his/her fishing boat
and gear, on the other.
A licence gone from a fishingcommunity is gone forever,together with all the associated
jobs, services and income.  If it were not
for social opposition, a worldwide
adoption of ITQs would have proceeded
faster.
Since marketable quota systems favour
the financially stronger, they invariably
lead to a gradual displacement of
small-scale individual or family-owned
fishing enterprises, and, sooner or later, to
the concentration of fishing rights in the
hands of a few, either specialized fishing
companies, or large holding corporations
for whom fishing may be only one branch
of a multifarious business. Such
concentration would eventually occur
even where there are legislative attempts
at stipulating acquisition of quota by some
maximum values. Hence, there is a
growing concern of ‘privatization by
stealth’.  It is incredible that managers
introducing this system into small-scale or
mixed fisheries would be unaware that its
social, economic and political
ramifications favour large-scale business
at the expense of local fisheries and
processing industries, and small-scale
operators, and threaten the survival of the
small-scale fishing sector. ITQs tend to
depress artisanal fishers and effectively
exclude part-time participants in local
fisheries, and favour the owners, while
disregarding crew members. Hence, the
selection of ITQ for such fisheries must
reflect the political and social attitudes of
the respective governments. 
Green non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have willy-nilly contributed to the
privatization trend. Although some of
them, for example, Greenpeace, have
joined protests against ITQs, there have
been NGOs with often exaggerated and
sometimes even fallacious alarmist
publications on the state of fishery
resources, painting the fishermen as the
main culprits, which fueled the
neoclassical economists’ fires. ITQ
advocates have claimed that privatization
based on marketable fishing quotas
would maintain fish stocks at sustainable
levels. 
Gold rush
Their main argument was: ‘If fishing
interests are allowed to invest in a
permanent share of the TAC, so that they’d
be sure of their relative share in the
landings of the respective species from a
given area, they wouldn’t need to apply
the ‘gold-rush’ mode of operation, and
would be interested in maintaining the
resource in an everlastingly sustainable
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condition.’  On the other hand, ITQs are a
rather peculiar sort of property rights:
one pays, sometimes quite heavily, for the
right to catch a certain amount of fish; one
never knows whether one will be able to
get it and at what operational cost, and
one doesn’t really control the resource
and doesn’t know whether by observing
the rules and sticking to the quota one is
not made a sucker by others. 
Hence, the potential well-intendedstewardship over the resourcesby quota-owners is, in fact, more
than often frustrated by high grading, fish
dumping and quota busting. While ITQs
indeed mitigated the ‘gold-rush’ fishing,
and their contribution to stock
conservation might have happened in a
few fisheries, it has been proved so only
in a couple of them. At the same time,
failures have been reported and
documented.  
The ITQ system would be socially and
nationally justifiable where the resource
is technically not accessible to small- and
medium-scale operators based in coastal
fishing communities, and where
exploitation of the resource requires
large-scale industrial fishing vessels and
fleet logistics. 
But where large numbers of small-scale
operators traditionally exploit inshore
and coastal resources, most of them
consider marketable quotas socially and
also economically wrong. Harvesting
methods that are most efficient in financial
terms are often the ones with the worst
collateral (including environmental)
impact, while less capital-intensive and
technologically and operationally
sophisticated fishing methods normally
allow wider and much more equitable
access to benefits from the fishery, with
less negative environmental and social
impacts. 
In Third World countries, for example,
coastal fisheries operate under many
stresses, the main one being invasion of
larger-scale fisheries into waters and
stocks accessible to, and fishable by,
small-scale fishermen, often with official
government support or high-circles’
well-paid ‘closing of the eye’. 
But, in such areas, large-scale operations
are less efficient than small-scale fishing.
They consume several times more fuel per
tonne of marketable fish than the
small-boat fishery; capital investment in
gear and vessels is higher; and they
produce fewer true national benefits. 
The same fish stock that can be fully and
profitably exploited by 10 trawlers
manned by 100 people, if allocated
exclusively to coastal fisherfolk using
nets, pots and hooks-and-lines, may
provide a living to many hundreds, or
maybe thousands of them, never mind
how low their calculated profits are going
to be. 
In many areas, both recreational and
small-scale commercial fisheries form the
backbone of coastal communities whose
economies revolve around fishing. It
causes money to flow to equipment and
bait, food and fuel suppliers, boatyards,
and a variety of commercial and technical
services in docks, harbours and marinas,
as well as those sectors of the tourist
industry that are centred on fishing
communities.
Hidden agendas
No doubt, management decisions depend
first of all on the prevailing policy
objectives. Different governments and the
powers that influence them may have
different, above-board and hidden
agendas. Hence, worldwide, there is no
consensus on the objectives of fisheries
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management. Some governments may
believe that safeguarding the well-being
of communities where fishery is an
important contributor to the local and,
thus, national economy is an important
goal. ‘Safeguarding the well-being’ means
creating and maintaining conditions that
would enable the fishing industry to get
an adequate return on investment, and
fishing people, sufficient take-home
incomes. It also may mean that in certain
special circumstances, the State may have
to intervene to help a community over a
temporary hardship, as it would do for
farmers hit by a drought year, or an
industrial community hit by an
earthquake. Isn’t that what governments
are for: collecting taxes, providing
services, and helping in trouble?
But some governments, as well asmost global, transnational andintergovernmental financial
institutions are driven by the neoclassical
ideology, especially when it comes to
economic relations with developing
nations. Undeniably, some of the
conditions of economic co-operation and
assistance imposed by those institutions
stem from their wish to protect their
investments from misconduct, corruption
and mismanagement. But, only too often,
under the hypocritical pretext of securing
free markets and economic liberalization,
their conditions are simply a tool of
protectionism.  And here we come to
fisheries subsidies. The United States, the
European Union (EU) and some other
developed countries, in view of the heavy
overcapitalization of their fishing fleets,
came to the quite appropriate decision to
stop subsidizing the construction of
fishing vessels. They want, however, to
have their new policies ‘globalized’ to
cover also the developing world. 
A number of developing countries too
have had, for many years, large national
fleets, and they should not subsidize
overcapacity as well. Any international
agreement involving fishery subsidies
should take into account small-scale
fishermen, who have to compete for the
local fish resources with large-scale
fishing fleets allowed to fish or poach on
their native, traditional fishing grounds.
Such fleets are subsidized, almost as a
rule, whether directly or in a roundabout
manner, as are the EU payments for access
to fishing grounds of Third World nations.
Small-scale fisherfolk operating under
such conditions deserve support both on
the part of their own respective
governments, as well as the international
community. Would it be too much to ask
the EU, and individual governments of
countries whose fleets are out to exploit
coastal fish stocks of their own or other
countries, as well as the governments who
allow such fleets into their coastal waters,
to give them a fighting chance?
Fisherfolk in the small-and medium-scale
sectors both, owners and hired hands,
who do not want to be dislocated from
their traditional fisheries by management
systems based on marketable fishing
rights, should recognize that their main
adversaries are the standard bearers of
neoclassical economics in national and
transnational financial institutions and
corporations, and their proxies in fisheries
management. It is very difficult to resist
such powerful interests in democratic
societies without joining forces. For this
purpose, provincial, national, and
regional fishermen’s associations should
organize under common umbrellas. Also,
international associations of fishing
people should create a joint worldwide
umbrella that wouldn’t affect their
individual structure and character, but
would enable them to board the
globalization train in weight and force.
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Philippines
Empowering participation 
The Community-based Coastal Resource Management 
Festival was a time to celebrate, reflect and ponder over strategies
The Community-based CoastalResources Management (CBCRM)Festival was held between 2 and 4
June 2003 in Subic Bay, Zambales,
Philippines. About 150 CBCRM
practitioners, implementers, researchers
and advocates from coastal communities,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
academic and research institutions,
development organizations and
government agencies in the Philippines
and selected countries in East Asia,
Europe and North America participated.
The Festival critically analyzed the
multifaceted achievements of CBCRM,
while celebrating its gains, so as to learn
lessons that will guide CBCRM practice
into the future.
There was much to celebrate at the
Festival, despite the fact that several
fishers have been killed, while others
remain in prison for conscientiously
safeguarding their marine resources and
apprehending illegal fishers.
The CBCRM movement could not have
achieved this level of commitment but for
a long and persistent process of
interaction and collaboration among the
coastal communities, NGOs, academics,
scientists and funding agencies.
“Our involvement in CBCRM has not only
changed our perspective about our
fishery but it has continued to develop
our views on the whole,” said Pedro
Valparaiso at a creative panel discussion
at the start of the festival. 
“It was we women who moved first,”
added Patricia Panaligan, chairperson of
a local people’s organization (PO). “We
decided to establish the fish sanctuaries
and our men backed us up, assisting in
demarcating it with buoys and
bamboos.”
From the manner in which these fisherfolk
spoke out at the festival, it was quite
obvious that they were not only capable
but also committed to the concept of
CBCRM. This seemed to be the result of a
dual process that has emerged as the crux
of CBCRM, namely, a painstaking process
of capacity-building of POs through very
creative and genuine participatory rural
appraisal (PRA), the motto being
“participation that empowers, with equity
as the guiding principal”.
This process that commenced in the
Philippines more than a decade ago as an
NGO initiative of partnership with coastal
communities to build local, democratic
organizations to conserve resources for
sustainable livelihoods, gained legitimacy
with the enactment of the new Fisheries
Code in 1998. The Code delineated 15 km
of the inshore waters as municipal waters,
beyond which the ‘commercial’ fishers
could operate. This Code also made
mandatory the creation of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resource Management Councils
(FARMCs) at the local municipal level,
based on the principles of
co-management. The local governments
could thereby enact suitable ordinances to
apply the Code. But, as we all know, mere
enactment of ordinances, even when they
are very progressive, do not make them
automatically applicable, unless there are
active POs at the base. Sensing a top-down
and manipulative approach, several of the
earlier operative CBCRM groups were
reluctant to get integrated into this initial
process.
Budget allocation
While the dominant trend of the
discussion during the Festival was that the
POs should engage the government and
the mainstream CBCRM process so that
budget allotments could be made to carry
the process ahead, one could not but be
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impressed by the reports of the POs on
how they collectively made their
management plans, demarcated their
sanctuaries, engaged in the regeneration
of the mangroves, apprehended illegal
fishers, developed paralegal skills, and
created systems to sustain their efforts
through contributing a percentage of their
incomes for the labour of the fish wardens.
The CBCRM groups that create theirown constitutions take on theresponsibility of not only
conserving the resources but also
developing ways of transforming these
efforts into means of livelihood. Several of
them launch better fish marketing
networks, make value-added products,
diversify income generation and even
create co-operatives and credit
mechanisms for their members. In fact, an
external evaluation conducted of the
Oxfam-supported efforts notes how
overburdened these POs are, taking on the
responsibility of conserving, nurturing
and policing the fish habitats as also the
livelihood alternatives in the
communities, even as most of the
members of the POs struggle to make ends
meet in their households.
Coming from India, which has a long
contiguous coastline, I could not but
appreciate how the geophysical formation
of this island nation of the Philippines
lends itself to such a programme of
micro-ecosystem management. In a way,
the cultural context of the Philippines,
which is far less hierarchical than in India,
is more cohesive and defining, and the
community does not seem to be as
complex as it is in India. Certainly, there
could be no absence of conflicting
interests, but, I guess, the groups that were
present at the Festival came from areas
where the chief conflicts arose mainly
between the legal and illegal fishers, and
not with other contenders for the coastal
resource. 
The CBCRM movement also struck me as
being a very feminist concept in fisheries,
where life and livelihood are put centre
stage, and caring and nurture become the
responsibility of men as well in the public
domain. 
Similar strides have to be made in the
private domain, although I did meet a
couple of women who said they felt very
supported by their husbands who now
also take responsibility in household
chores as they are required to be out in the
community handling their
responsibilities.
Reviewing challenges
True to the spirit of learning fostered at the
Festival, there was also time for critical
assessment and reviewing the challenges
for the future. One of these was the need
to widen the concept of management
beyond the micro-ecosystem, which now
focuses mainly on habitat conservation, to
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creating alliances with other resource
users in the watershed. 
Several warnings were flagged
regarding:
• the implications of communities
demanding tenurial rights that
will deny use by others;
• the ability of the POs to remain
democratic so that
‘empowerment’ does not result in
domination;
• the need to continue to strengthen
support mechanisms as the NGOs
withdraw and the POs come of age;
• establishing sustainable
mechanisms within the POs that
are transparent and accountable; 
• creating an enabling policy
environment so that the processes
of co-management remain
democratic; 
• transforming the gains into
tangible livelihood inputs; and
• further addressing the threats of
globalization vis-à-vis markets
and other terrestrial rights. 
The challenge is to remain eternally
vigilant.
It was indeed striking to hear people echo
that CBCRM is not merely a management
strategy but a way of life. Committed as
they are to a process, it is also a challenge
to the NGOs to practise what they preach
to the POs, thereby making resource
management a way of life and fostering
communities of practice wherever they
are. For the seven or so POs that
collaborated in organizing the Festival,
this is not a distant dream as they
successfully managed to transcend
differences among themselves and
generate a creative atmosphere with
tremendous energy.
This Festival was the third in a series of
such celebrations, a way of collaborative
learning, storytelling and documenting.
In the words of Elmer Ferrer et al, “This
process of learning and the relationships
between people that are established as a
result of this process, generates social
energy that advances and sustains the
CBCRM process. Social energy becomes
manifest when individuals and groups
work together to achieve common
aspirations.”
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Fish trade
Trading in fish as food
A new, ongoing study hopes to shed light on the impact and 
consequences of international trade in fish and fish products
The Food and AgricultureOrganization of the UnitedNations  (FAO) and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) of Norway have got
together to conduct a joint study on the
impact of international trade in fishery
products on food security.
International trade in fishery products has
increased substantially since the
mid-1980s. The total value of exports was
valued at US $20 bn in 1984. It rose sharply
to US$55 bn in 2000. Enhanced demand in
the developed countries, cheaper
methods of preservation and
transportation were probably the main
reasons for this increase. However,
increases in production, the introduction
of the 200-mile exclusive economic zones
and lower tariffs also contributed to this
development. The trade was largely
between developed countries or from
developing countries to the developed
countries. About half the exports in value
terms are from the developing countries.
It is noteworthy that as much as 20 per
cent of the value of exports come from the
low-income food-deficit countries.
The varied impact of trade—at the
macro-level, on the countries involved,
and, at the micro-level, on the
people—has become a matter of global
concern and analysis. The formation of the
World Trade Organization has brought a
more formalized structure to international
trade. The once-held conviction that trade
should automatically increase the welfare
of all the parties involved is now being
questioned.
This study will analyze the growing
international trade in fishery products,
which is marked by diversity. By studying
a variety of identifiable ‘representative’
cases from the overall global context, the
study seeks to assess the impact that trade
has on people’s food security—the
physical and economic access to sufficient,
safe and nutritious food at all times. The
case studies will examine the positive and
negative impacts that international trade
has on fish availability and accessibility;
employment and income generation; the
fish stocks and the potential for hard
foreign currency earnings. All these
aspects have a direct or indirect bearing on
food security. 
The study will focus on fish producers,
fishworkers and fish consumers in fish
exporting and importing countries. By
understanding the modus operandi of
international fish trade, the study will try
and identify the right circumstances,
institutions and mechanisms, to facilitate
“food security and development-
enhancing” trade.  The aim will be to
understand the consequences of
trade—who and what makes the gains
and losses, and where and when they
accrue.
The study, to be conducted and completed
in 2003, will draw on the expertise of
several internationally reputed experts in
the realm of trade, fisheries and food
security issues. The executing agency is
the FAO with its vast technical expertise on
all the above aspects. Within the FAO it is
the Fish Utilization and Marketing
Services of the Fisheries Department,
which takes the responsibility for the
overall conduct of the study. It will be ably
assisted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Royal Norwegian Government that
will follow the study closely and comment
on its progress.
International experts
An International Reference Group (IRG)
composed of a distinguished set of
international experts and academicians
will, in their personal capacities, give
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overall guidance to the study from the
perspective of achieving its goal of
influencing trade policy formulation and
suggesting strategies for food
security-enhancing trade. The details of
the study process will be overseen by an
Expert Group (EG) composed of persons
with first-hand knowledge of fish trade
and food security issues, who, again in
their personal capacities, will assist in the
choice of case study centres and meet
occasionally to review work progress.
The day-to-day monitoring of the study
will be undertaken by a Chief Consultant
(CC) responsible to the FAO and the MFA,
and who will play the key role in liaising
with the IRG and EG.
The case studies will be undertaken by
National Consultants (NC) who will be
identified by the EG based on suggestions
from the IRG and the numerous contacts
that FAO has all over the world. The
countries where case studies will be
undertaken include: Brazil, Chile, Ghana,
Kenya, Namibia, Nicaragua, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand
and Vietnam.
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For more details on the study and
its current status, visit http://www.
tradefoodfish.org
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Trawl fishers
Ganging up
The experience of trawler fishermen of Chennai, India 
shows how user groups find it difficult to manage their fisheries 
Traditionally, the fishermen fromChennai and Chengulput areas ofTamil Nadu, India used madavalai
(traditional dip-net made of cotton),
thurivalai (cotton drag-net), edavalai (nylon
dip-net) and periyavalai (cotton shore
seine) to fish both pelagic and demersal
species.  These fishing nets required more
investment and their operations needed
more than one kattumaram (catamaran)
and more labour.  Thus, each fishing
hamlet had three or four nets of each type,
which gave employment for all the
fishermen of the village.  All the villagers
were involved in groups in fishing, living
in harmony with neighbouring villagers.
In earlier days, there was no individual
fishing, except hook-and-line fishing,
which was performed by one or two
persons jointly in a single catamaran.  Fish
aggregating devices (FADs) were also very
common in those days.
Since all the fishing operations required
groups, each fisherman felt responsible
for managing the fishery resources and
there was no competition among
fishermen.  The benefit was shared
equally among the fishermen who felt that
the resource in the sea is for the common
good.  Also, each village observed a
territorial limit for fishing operations.
There was no overexploitation and no one
poached the other’s resources, thereby
giving every hamlet an equal opportunity
to benefit from the resources.  
In the early 1950s, nylon gill-nets of
different mesh sizes were introduced.
These weighed little, cost less and could
be easily handled by two or three persons.
Individual fishermen started to buy these
nets and employed two or three persons
on a share basis.  This paved the way for
the erosion of group or community
fishing, and encouraged individual
fishing, leading to competition and
fishing during the night, resulting in the
continuous disturbance of the sea.
In the 1960s, the government of Tamil
Nadu introduced mechanized gill-nets
with the help of Norway.  The first boat
introduced was a 26-ft bottom gill-netter.
Such boats were given to fishermen’s
societies and community leaders.  In
1965-66, 30-ft gill-netters and trawling
boats were introduced.  Simultaneously,
the export markets were opened with the
collaboration of Japan and the US.  During
this period, fishing operations with
mechanized boats were carried out in the
40-km stretch between Ennore and
Thiruvanmiyur.  The maximum fuel they
carried per day was 50 litres.  The fishing
was carried out during daytime, from 6
am to 2 pm. During this time, they did two
hauls and got good catches.  In 1969-70,
32-ft boats were introduced.  In 1972-73,
the area of operation was extended to
Sriharikotta in the north and
Mahabalipuram in the south, a stretch of
about 120 km.
During this period, the shrimp catch was
very good.  The fishing was done both by
gill-netters and trawl boats.  Since the
shrimp were caught in the shallow waters,
all the boats were concentrated in the
inshore areas where the traditional
fishermen fished, resulting in a
continuous ploughing of the fishing
ground, which caused the resources to
start depleting very fast.  
Heavy losses
Also, the movement of boats in the inshore
areas made the traditional fishing more
vulnerable. Fishing operations by
mechanized boats damaged the
traditional craft and gear, and caused
heavy losses to the traditional sectors in
terms of resource and properties.  This led
to conflicts between mechanized and
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traditional fishermen in 1977, when the
catamaram fishermen started seizing
boats operating in the shallow waters. 
The government interfered andintroduced some regulations onthe mechanized sector, and also a
territorial boundary between traditional
and mechanized fishermen, which was
patrolled by the Fisheries Department
officials. This conflict led to the creation
of the Federation of Panchayat Councils
(in Tamil, Aikkiya Panchayat Sabai) in
Royapuram.  
Around 90 per cent of the boatowners
lived in Royapuram and neighbouring
villages, where they were attacked by the
catamaran fishermen. To get support
from the traditional fishermen, the
boatowners conducted a meeting of
about 10 villages in the Royapuram area
and formed an Aikkiya Panchayat. 
At the panchayat meeting, the boatowners
promised to develop their village
economically. They collected 25 paise per
basket of fish sold and handed over the
money to the Aikkiya Panchayat. 
The money was spent for village needs.
In this way, with the help of the Aikkiya
Panchayat, the boatowners got immunity
from attack by the catamaran fishermen.
Fishing disputes between boatowners
and catamaran fishermen were now
cleared through the panchayat.  
Until 1977, the maximum fuel carried on
board a boat was 150 litres per trip.  In the
1980s, the shrimp catch began declining
and some of the trawlers started to fish
finfish and squid in the deep sea, at about
40-42 fathoms, where some ridges
(patches of rocks) are present.  They
caught about 100 baskets of fish per trip
(around 2,500 kg).  The fishing operation
was between 3 am and 2 pm daily.  By
1985-87, the fertile ground had become
deserted by continuous trawling.  Daily
fishing became unprofitable and
fishermen began to fish continuously
throughout the night and the next day,
and slowly long trips (stay fishing)
became common.  The boats now began to
carry 200 litres of fuel per trip, along with
some ice.
In 1987, the mechanized fishermen started
to feel the depletion of fish resources in
and around Chennai due to the
continuous ploughing of the fishing
grounds and changes in the bottom
ecosystem.  Most of the fertile grounds
became unfertile.  In order to stay out at
sea longer, the fishermen built onboard
fish-holds to store the fish with ice. 
Two-day trips
They also carried one 140-kg block of ice
with them, as well as extra fuel, stored in
plastic containers.  With these facilities,
they started to go for two-three day trips
between Kalpakkam and the northern
part of Shriharikotta.
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With this system, the fishermencaught more fish, saved fueland spent more time fishing. At
the same time, boat maintenance costs
increased due to the continuous running
of the engine.  The fishermen also found
that the Andhra Pradesh coast has greater
potential, which can be easily exploited
with better facilities like larger boats,
bigger fish-holds and more fuel.  They
thus began to desire the big boats
available in Mangalore in Karnataka.
Some of the fishermen brought these 40-ft
boats from there in 1987.  These could
carry 1000 litres of fuel and 10 to 15 blocks
of ice to stay at sea for three or four days,
fishing along the Nellore coast of Andhra.
The catch increased per unit effort.  Soon,
every fisherman in Chennai wanted to
follow this method.  The fishermen
started modifying their 32-ft boats into
40-ft boats with engine capacity of 120 hp.
In 1990, the Central government pumped
money into the sector by giving 20 per cent
subsidy for new boats through the
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD).  This led to the
sudden increase of 40-42-ft trawlers in a
short time.  The boats had fuel tanks with
capacities of about 1,000-1,500 litres, and
huge insulated fish-holds under the deck
to hold about 2.5-3 tonnes of fish.  Extra
fuel was carried in plastic containers and
about 3 tonnes of ice in the fish-holds.  One
important innovation was the fibre
coating to the outer sides of the boats,
which provided more buoyancy and
added confidence to the fishermen.  With
these facilities, they started to go farther to
northern Nellore and crossed Prakasam
District in Andhra Pradesh.
The 1980s was the period when the trawl
fishery progressed remarkably and
attained peak production of 23,953 tonnes
in 1989. The threefold rise in the annual
fish production observed in 1985-89,
compared to the previous five-year
period, was due to the start of long-trip
shrimp trawling operations off the
Sriharikotta-Nellore coast, which resulted
in greater catches and catch rates than the
short-trip shrimp trawlers operating off
the Chennai and adjacent coasts. 
In the beginning, the Andhra fishermen
did not give any problem to the Chennai
boats.  But the Chennai boats violated the
local fishery regulation by operating their
trawlers in the shallow waters and
damaging the craft and gear of the
traditional fishermen, who were even
assaulted at sea. This led the local
catamaran fishermen to retaliate.  They
started to catch and detain the Chennai
boats, offloaded their catches and
collected fines.  This resulted in regular
law-and-order problems in the sea.  
The Andhra fishermen claimed that the
Tamil Nadu fishermen had no right to fish
in their waters, particularly in the notified
traditional fishermen’s areas. But the
Chennai fishermen claimed they were
fishing in the deep sea beyond the
traditional fishing areas and were not
damaging the craft and gear.  
The Chennai fishermen also argued that,
as citizens of India, they are free to go
anywhere to do business, and preventing
them from fishing in Andhra waters was
against fundamental rights guaranteed in
the Indian Constitution.
From 1993, the Tamil Nadu government
started a solatium fund by collecting
money from the Chennai boatowners.
Each boatowner would pay Rs500 per
year to the government, who would give
a compensation amount to any victims of
clashes between the Chennai and Andhra
fishermen.  After a few years, the
boatowners found it difficult to pay the
amount, and so they requested the
government to reduce it, which was done.
They now pay Rs300 per year.  This
amount is meant only for those who are
either injured or have lost their lives in
clashes, and not for the penalties sought
by Andhra fishermen who detain the
Chennai boats.
As the conflicts usually occur in Nellore
and Prakasam districts, the Chennai
fishermen started to avoid these areas,
even though the grounds are very fertile.
They began to go further north and now
reach up to the Kakinada coast, with basic
equipment like echo sounders, compasses
and global positioning systems (GPS). 
Not seaworthy
Most of the boats are not certified for
seaworthiness. Carrying about
2,000-3,000 litres of fuel and 40-45 blocks
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of ice (weighing around 6,300 kg), they
spend about 10-15 days at sea.  
In the 1960s, only Pablo-typemechanized boats of 26 ft in lengthwere introduced for bottom gill-nets,
and in 1965, the preferred size became 30
ft.  After that, fishermen started giving
importance to trawlers rather than
gill-netters because of good shrimp
catches and good returns from the export
markets.  Trawlers became dominant
between 1965 and 1990.  In 1980, the
number of gill-net boats had declined to
about 10 to 15, compared with 500
trawlers.  Before 1990, the gill-nets were
operated between Mahabalipuram and
Sriharikotta in the 20-50 m depth range
throughout the year except during the
northeast monsoon season. The main
species caught were shark, ray, seer,
carangid and tuna.
In 1990, seeing the improvement in
trawlers with respect to size, catch and
storage, the gill-net fishermen also started
to convert their small boats into big size
(42-ft or 12-m) boats and went for
long-trip fishing in distant places off the
Andhra coast and earned good profits.
At the same time, the catch of the 42-ft
trawlers started declining.  Since gill-net
fishing is not as risky as trawling and also
giving good profit, the attention of the
trawler fishermen was diverted to gill-net
fishing.  So in 1997-98, some of the trawler
owners converted their big trawling boats
into gill-net boats for better profits.  All
the big gill-net boats have insulated
fish-holds as in trawlers and large fuel
tanks to store 750–1,000 litres of fuel.
They carry 30 blocks (4,200 kg) of ice, and
use long gill-nets of about 150–300
fathoms length (450–900 m), weighing
about 1–1.5 tonnes.
After the conversion to a larger size, the
gill-net boats go up to Nizampatinam to
catch shark, ray, seer, carangid, tuna and
flying fish.  They go into deeper waters of
more than 100 fathoms (300 m), about
60-75 km from the shore. At present, more
than 70 gill-netters are operating from the
Chennai fishing harbour and nearly 20
trawlers are being converted to gill-net
boats. Alongside the gill-nets are
longlines with  200 hooks for shark,
fished in the deeper rocky areas locally
called maadai, where the trawlers also
operate for fin fish and squid.  Since the
trawler fishermen are in the majority, they
banned longline fishing from gill-net
boats.  
At present, the trawlers operating from
Chennai comprise four different overall
length groups, 9.5-10 m, 11 m, 12 m and
13-14 m (the conventional 32-ft, 36-ft, 40-ft
and 45-ft), with the horsepower varying
between 90 and 120.  The vessels of overall
length 9.5-10 m and 11 m exclusively
operate fish trawls northeast of Chennai in
slightly deep waters of 30-40m adjacent to
the rocky patches, whereas the 12-m and
a few 11-m vessels conduct daily shrimp
trawling trips in the coastal waters off
Chennai at depths of 15-30 m.  The
trawlers with length range of 13-14 m and
120 hp engines are engaged in long-trip
fish and shrimp trawling off Shriharikotta
and Kakinada at depths of 15-30 m for
durations of 15 days.
When mechanized boats were first
introduced in Chennai, there was no
union for mechanized boatowners. Later,
they formed two associations and one
co-operative society.  Both long-trip
gill-netters and trawler boatowners are
members of the Chennai-Chengai
Boatowners Association. The madai
boatowners have formed an association
called the Singaravellar Boatowners
Association.  
The Chennai Boatowners Association
soon became the trumpet of the ruling
political party.  That is one reason why
fishing regulations are not implemented
properly along the Chennai coast. The
other reason is that the Chennai fishing
harbour is situated in the Royapuram
legislative constituency, where the
majority are fishermen working in the
mechanized sector. Most of the
Association rules favour its leaders and
the other large boatowners.
That is why most boatowners are not
interested in renewing their registration,
paying berth charges or solatium funds
and taking out insurance on their boats.  
Fishing holidays
To replenish fishery resources, all coastal
States in India have been implementing
fishing holidays of 45 days every year for
two years now.  But artisanal fishermen
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fish during this period with the
knowledge of fisheries officials, who
know that they are not doing any
destructive fishing like trawling.  In Tamil
Nadu, the fishing holiday is declared
every year from 1 May to 15 June. Though
the boatowners realize it is good for the
replenishment of resources, they are ready
to go fishing if there is no legal action
against violators.  Evidently, the
boatowners are not too bothered about
managing the resources. They are now
claiming compensation from the
government for the holiday period.
In an effort at self-management, the
Boatowners Association has banned
midwater trawling and molluscan conch
shell (chank) fishing. It banned longline
fishing by gill-net boats, since they were
operating in the same rocky grounds as
bottom trawling. It banned outsiders
other than Chennai, Chengai and
Kanchipuram fishermen. It banned the
addition of new boats. However, the
Association has not banned shrimp
trawling which is exclusively operated
very near the coast, just opposite the river
mouth, using very small-mesh nets
(semakkera net) and damaging the fishing
ground more than any other nets.
 
 In
d
ia
This article is by B. Subramanian
(bsmanian9@rediffmail.com), a
Fisheries and Environmental
Consultant based in Chennai, India
SAMUDRA JULY 2003 35
Documentary 
Under the sun
A film recently produced by ICSF documents the plight 
of the transient fisherfolk of Jambudwip island in West Bengal, India
Jambudwip is a 20-sq km
island in the district of
South 24-Parganas, in
the Indian State of West
Bengal, in the
Sunderbans delta. Since
at least 1955, Jambudwip
has been used as a base
for fishery operations and as a fish-drying
site, mostly by small-scale, artisanal
fishworkers. Behundi jal or stake-net
fishery is the traditional activity practised
in different parts of the Sunderbans delta.
The largest stake-net fishing operation in
the Sunderbans is based in Jambudwip. 
However, this traditional source of
livelihood and sustenance is now under
serious threat. It is being alleged that the
seasonal ’occupation’ of the Jambudwip
island by fishermen and the fish-drying
activity is a non-forest activity that cannot
be permitted under the Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980, without prior
approval of the central government. The
West Bengal government has been asked
to remove all traces of  ‘encroachment’ on
Jambudwip island. 
While the Fisheries Department of West
Bengal has strongly defended the
fishermen’s claim to the seasonal use of
the island for their fishery, the State’s
Forest Department is bitterly opposed.
The fishermen are now living in the
shadow of uncertainty. Will their
two-generations old fishery be treated as
an activity eligible for regularization or
will they be summarily evicted when
their fisheries are dismissed as ineligible
for regularization? 
These issues are dealt with in the
documentary film, Under the Sun,
produced by the International Collective
in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) and
directed by Rita Banerji for Dusty Foot
Productions. The film tackles the issues
involved in the stake-net fishery of
Jambudwip. It traces the genesis of the
standoff between the fishworkers and the
government, and analyzes the processes
that led to the government action against
the traditional fishworkers. It also
documents the response of the
fishworkers, as well as the actions taken
by the National Fishworkers’ Forum to
help them regain their rights to the fishery.
Copies of the film (format: CD-ROM;
duration: 36 minutes; language: English)
can be had from ICSF for a suggested
contribution of US$15 each. Please contact
icsf@vsnl.com. 
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Minamata disease
Return us our healthy bodies
This excerpt recounts the harrowing tale of the methylmercury 
poisoning disease that struck Minamata in Japan nearly half a century ago
The next day in the library, I look forW. Eugene Smith’s 1975 photoessay, Minamata: Words and Photos,
which he coauthored with his Japanese
wife.  The picture that Jeff can recall so
clearly is spread across two pages.  The
lines are stark and classical.  In the manner
of Mary cradling the crucified body of
Christ, a naked mother holds the body of
her half-grown daughter in a Japanese
bath.  The mother’s upturned hand, which
lifts the girl’s legs, is balanced by the
daughter’s downturned hand, which just
brushes the water’s surface.  The mother
looks at her daughter with adoration.  The
daughter’s eyes are rolled skyward—as if
to God—but there is no light of awareness
in them.  
Suddenly, the viewer sees how the fingers
touching the water are unnaturally bent,
as are the rail-thin legs, and how in the
centre of the girl’s naked chest, which
floats in the centre of the photograph
itself, there is a deep hole that is not a
wound but some kind of terrible
malformation.
The daughter’s name is Tomoko.  She was
born in 1956 and died two years after her
portrait stunned the world, in 1977.
Minamata is an ancient city along the
Shiranui Sea in southern Japan. Since
feudal times it has been a fishing
community, but now Minamata is mostly
known as the birthplace of Minamata
disease, which is not a disease at all but
simply another name for methylmercury
poisoning.
Mercury is an ancient element.  Called
quicksilver by Aristotle, it was named
after the speedy planet by 6th Century
alchemists who thought it possessed the
power to turn base metals into gold.  They
were wrong.  But mercury does have the
power to speed up certain chemical
reactions.  Which is how the city
Minamata and the element mercury came
to have a common destiny.
In the 1930s and 1940s, a factory in
Minamata called Chisso began
manufacturing acetaldehyde and vinyl
chloride—both ingredients in plastics.  To
do so, it used metallic mercury as a
catalyst, which was then dumped into the
wastewater that entered Minamata Bay.
In the spring of 1956, a five-year-old girl
was brought to the factory hospital
because her speech was slurred and her
gait unsteady. 
Not long after, her younger sister began
exhibiting the same symptoms. Then four
of her neighbors became delirious and
started to stagger drunkenly.  The director
of the hospital, Dr Hajime Hosokawa, was
alarmed.  He reported to the authorities
that “an unclarified disease of the central
nervous systems has broken out.”
Because of the clustering of affected
families, Dr Hosokawa assumed he was
dealing with a contagious illness—thus
the label ‘Minamata disease’.  An
investigation soon uncovered 50 more
cases.
But three clues emerged that argued
against an infectious cause.  Cats living in
the homes of stricken families had
mysteriously died.  The affected families
almost always had ties to the fishing
industry.  And the homes of the additional
50 cases were scattered over a wide area
and not confined to any one
neighborhood.  What united the victims
was a strikingly similar progression of
maladies.  
Black curtain
First the hands and feet began to tingle.
Then there was difficulty holding
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chopsticks.  Words became “entangled
and knotted” in the mouth.  Eventually,
hearing was muffled, and a black curtain
fell over part of the visual field.  In some,
there was restlessness and a tendency
towards shouting.  Finally, general
paralysis set in, the hands became
gnarled, swallowing became difficult,
and death soon followed.
Once the investigation was underway, observations previouslyreported but subsequently
dismissed suddenly took on new
meaning.  For six years or more,
fishermen had complained about dead
seaweed and empty clam and oyster
shells.  There had been other ominous
sightings, too.  Floating fish.  Seabirds
that dropped from the sky while in flight.
Paralyzed octopus.  Dogs, pigs, and cats
that were seen to whirl about violently
and then die.  
Looking at all the evidence
together—both medical and
environmental—the study group issued
a report in the fall of 1956 concluding,
correctly, that Minamata disease was not
an infectious illness after all but was a
form of heavy-metal poisoning caused
from eating fish and shellfish from the
bay.  Some kind of heavy metal was
getting into the waters of the bay, and the
evidence pointed to Chisso.
The release of this report revealing the
cause of the mysterious disease should
have marked the end of a terrible story.
Instead, it was only the beginning.  The
local government opposed the study
group’s principal recommendation—a
ban on fishing in the bay.  At the same
time, Chisso, the only possible culprit,
refused to change its practices.  Instead, it
hired experts to refute the evidence and
insist there was no proof to implicate the
company’s actions as the reason for the
problem.  Meanwhile, a university
research team announced it would study
the problem further.
At the end of almost four more years of
study, this is what the research team
found:  That cats fed fish from Minamata
Bay developed symptoms of Minamata
disease.  That the Bay was highly
contaminated with methylmercury.  That
the livers and kidneys of human victims
who died of Minamata disease contained
high level of methylmercury. That the hair
of living Minamata victims contained
high levels of methylmercury.  That
workers exposed to methylmercury in a
British factory had very similar symptoms
to the people of Minamata.
Chisso responded that it used only
metallic mercury, not methylmercury,
and, therefore, its wastewater could not be
source of the problem.  What Chisso did
not say was that its own hospital  director,
the same Dr Hosokawa who had first
noticed the problem, had in 1959 induced
Minamata disease in cats fed Chisso
factory sludge.  This information Chisso
executives kept to themselves.  Dr
Hosakawa—unlike Dr Kelsey before
him—kept quiet, too.
During those same four year that the
research team toiled on and the company
doctor held his tongue, the following
events happened in Minamata: Chisso
diverted some of its wastewater into a
nearby river and spread the
contamination further. Increasing
number of babies began to be born in
Minamata with what appeared to be
cerebral palsy. And the local government
began advising abortions for all pregnant
women whose hair levels of
methylmercury exceeded 50 parts per
million.
The babies with cerebral palsy turned out
to have congenital Minamata disease.
Although they had never eaten fish from
the bay, their mothers all had.  Some of
these babies were also blind or deaf.  Some
had unusually small heads and deformed
teeth.  Some had tremors and were prone
to convulsions.  
Autopsy reports showed that those born
with Minamata disease had more
extensive brain damage than those who
contracted the disease after birth.  Not
counting these congenital cases, 29 per
cent of the children born in the most
contaminated areas between 1955 and
1959 showed signs of mental deficiencies.
Wastewater sludge
Then, in 1962, someone found a forgotten
bottle of Chisso wastewater sludge sitting
on a laboratory shelf, and researchers
uncovered the critical missing link in their
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painstakingly constructed chain of
evidence.  
The contents of the bottle testedpositive for methylmercury.  Thisfinding proved beyond a doubt
what many suspected all along: that the
factory’s waste disposal practices were
somehow converting elemental mercury,
a weaker poison, into organic mercury, a
formidable one.  
But if the research team supposed that
demonstration of absolute proof would
trigger action, the joke was on them.
Chisso blithely went on dumping
methylmercury for six more years,
stopping only in 1968 when its method of
making plastic materials became
outmoded and new technology was
introduced.
In the end, it was citizen activism and
photography, and not the slow
accumulation of scientific knowledge that
awakened awareness about the ecology of
methylemercury.  In 1969, 29 families filed
a lawsuit against Chisso on behalf of the
dead, dying and critically ill.  Other
families appealed to the government for
action.  
Still others began direct negotiations with
the company, staging sit-ins outside its
Tokyo offices.  Protesters there were
arrested and beaten, including Smith
himself, who was on hand to document
their activities.  His photographs went out
anyway, including one that shows
Tomoko being presented before a table of
dark-suited officials from Chisso, while
petitioners demanded that the men look at
her and touch her body.  Her face wears
the same fixed expression it did in the
bath.
In March 1973, the Kumamoto District
Court ruled in favour of the families.  It
noted in its verdict that Chisso had failed
both in it obligation to confirm safety
“through researches and study” and in its
obligation to provide preventive
measures “if a case should arise where
there be some doubt as to safety.”  In the
final analysis, the court ruled, “no plant
can be permitted to infringe on and run at
the sacrifice of the lives and the health of
the regional residents.”
In 1998, I found a translated thesis in the
library containing interviews with some
of the original Minimata activists.
Conducted many years after the trial’s
conclusion and the payment of indemnity,
they express continuing desire for a more
profound kind of resolution.  
Money nuisance
One said, “[W]e most ardently long to
have the sea and the mountains returned
to us as they were before
pollution. Money is a nuisance, a
troublemaker in the family and in the
village...The other world in which we
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used to live should be brought back to us
here and now. Our hope, a very slight
hope, is to bring the sea back...and an
even slighter hope is to return to us our
healthy bodies of bygone days.”
The most recent forecast is that mercury
concentrations in the bay are expected to
decline to background levels by the year
2011—more that a half century after Dr.
Hosokawa first gave a name to Minamata
disease and then fell silent.  Fish and
shellfish in Minamata Bay were declared
safe for consumption in 1997.
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Fishing gear
Hook, line and sinker
The small-scale fisheries sector in Nigeria is 
characterized by wide variety of fishing gear
Nigeria is situated on the west coastof Africa between longitudes 2˚29’ and 14˚ 37’ east and latitudes
4˚ 16’ and 13˚52’ north of the equator.  It is
endowed with large bodies of marine,
brackish and freshwater systems. 
Nigeria has a coastline of about 583 km,
which borders the Atlantic Ocean in the
Gulf of Guinea, a maritime area of 46,000
sq km up to 200-m depth and an exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of 210,910 sq km The
narrow continental shelf, which is about
15 km wide in the west and 27.8 km wide
in the east, covers an area of about 41,000
sq km.
The brackish water systems, including
creeks, estuaries and lagoons, represent
about 0.48 mn hectares (ha). The shallow
maritime area covers 2.67 mn ha up to 50
m depth, within which many of the coastal
small-scale artisanal fishermen operate.
The freshwater bodies include the rivers
Niger and Benue, natural lakes like Chad,
and manmade lakes like Kanji, Jiga and
Bakokori, as well as reservoirs and flood
plains. The total area of inland water
bodies has been estimated at about 12 mn
ha. The small-scale artisanal fishery sector
remains the backbone of fish production
in Nigeria, contributing a minimum of 70
per cent of the total fish production in the
last decade. In 2000, a total of 101,101
fishing units operated by 283,292
fishermen produced 325,100 tonnes of
fish.
The artisanal fisheries can be categorized
into: (a) the brackish water or estuarine
canoe fishery operating in lagoons, creeks
and estuaries; (b) the coastal canoe fishery
operating usually within 5 nautical miles
of the coastline, which is a non-trawling
zone statutorily reserved for small-scale
fisheries. (Motorization allows some of
the operators to venture farther into the
sea, up to 50-m depth.); (c) the freshwater
canoe fisheries in lakes, major rivers and
their tributaries, and streams. 
The mono-hull wooden canoes include
dugout canoes (3–7 m in length), planked
canoes (4–12.5 m), and planked dugout or
half-dugout canoes. The latter are dugout
canoes built up with planks on the sides in
order to increase the hull size and include
the large Ghana canoes (16–18.5 m long),
which are motorized with 40 hp outboard
engines. The other wooden canoes are
largely nonmotorized.
Apart from full-time fishermen, there are
part-time fishers who engage in other
activities such as farming. Thousands of
Nigerian fisherfolk migrate seasonally
from their villages to other fishing
communities or settlements, both within
and outside the country, including
Cameroon and Gabon. Fisherfolk from
other countries, like Ghana and Republic
of Benin, have migrated and settled in a
few coastal village since the early 19th
Century. Fishermen migrations also occur
in inland waters.
The artisanal fisherman’s main wealth is
in the fishing gear, which show a lot of
variations from one location to the other.
The many and various fishing gear types
which are used or employed by the
small-scale artisanal fishermen in Nigeria
are highlighted below.
Wall of netting
The large or massive watsa net with, small
mesh (10–50 mm), has enough length
(500–1,000 m) and depth (up to 50 m) to
surround the shoal/school of fish from all
sides and from below. It is usually fitted
with purse-rings and purse-lines to
facilitate pursing/closing the bottom of
the net. An impenetrable wall of netting is
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allowed to sink rapidly around a shoal of
fish, after which the bottom edge is
closed.
The net is operated by a crew of 12-16 fishermen on board the largeGhana canoe to catch
pelagic/surface or midwater fish species
such as the bonga (Ethmalosa fimbriata) and
sardines (Sardinlla aurita and S.
maderensis) in fairly deep coastal waters
up to 75 m. The bottom of the net is closed,
making sure it does not get entangled on
the seabed, and the fish scooped bit by bit
onto the deck of the boat.
This is perhaps the most efficient gear
type. The net surrounds large quantities
of pelagic fish, and the landings
constitute high-grade quality fish
suitable for canning. The gear’s efficiency
depends on the size of the net, the size of
the fish shoal, the swimming speed of the
fish, and the speed of the motorized canoe
used during the fishing operation.
Selectivity is very low (almost nil) as no
fish is allowed to escape. Though the
fishermen have the option to select the
desired fish size and release juvenile,
young and immature fish, that is rarely
done.
A huge capital investment is required for
nets and procurement of the large Ghana
canoe.  Great professional skills are also
required for making nets and fishing
operations. The purse-seine net is one of
the most complicated nets to operate at
sea because of its huge size. Many
Ghanaian fishermen and a few Nigerians
operate the watsa small-scale purse-seine
nets in the coastal waters of Nigeria to
catch bonga and sardines (called sawa).
The beach seine net is designed with two
long wings and a cod end fitted at the
centre or on one side of the wings. The
head line ranges between a few metres
(say, 200 m) to about 1 km or more in
length. The net is operated in shallow
waters (5–25 m depth) and very close to
the shore or beach. It is designed with
enough depth such that the bottom/lead
line touches the sea bed, in order to
prevent fish from escaping underneath. It
is set in a semicircle in the water and
manually pulled or dragged with the aid
of the towing rope attached to each of the
wings. In the process, the cod end is
gradually drawn close to the shore and is
finally hauled out of water on to the beach.
Coastal beach seine nets are set during the
day only. They are also operated from
wooden canoes 9-12 m in length. In over
70 per cent of the operations, no outboard
engine is used. The net targets mainly the
demersal fish species, including croakers
(Pseudotolithus spp.), sole (Cynoglossus
spp.), jackfish (Caranx spp.), shiny nose
(Galeoides decadactylus), barracuda
(Sphyraena spp.), moonfish (Selene dorsalis)
and grunters (Pomadays jubelini). Beach
seine nets without bags (50-120 m long
and 3-8 m deep) are operated from the
beach or on board the canoe midwater or
within a relatively calm body of water
such as a lagoon, creek, estuary, lake or
any other water reservoir.
While many live fish specimens are
caught, a few are in a semicomatose or
unconscious state, and some are dead
either due to entanglement in the mesh of
the wings or crushed by the weight of fish
herded into the cod end. The efficiency of
operations depends on the mesh size of
the net and the size of the water body.
Lift-nets are rectangular or circular
implements which are lifted vertically out
of the water from a submerged position to
catch fish or crab that get attracted above
the net. The water is strained in the
process.
The rectangular atalla lift-net is usually
constructed with a 10-25 mm mesh size. It
is highly selective for the pelagic fish
Pellonula ionensiis in rivers and lakes. 
The circular crab gear (called garawa),
which is baited with fish or chicken parts,
is used extensively in the lagoons, creeks
and estuaries. In some areas the crab gear
is made of small conical bags to improve
catching efficiency.
Varying mesh size
Cast-nets are conical falling nets with lead
weights attached at regular intervals
along the perimeter of the cone. The
netting material is monofilament or
multifilament nylon with twine thickness
and mesh sizes varying between 12 mm
and 100 mm. For each net used in streams,
rivers with shallow depths and in the
Lagos lagoon, the total stretched height of
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the cone varies between 3 m and 6 m.
However, in estuaries and rivers with
deeper waters (over 9 m), the cone height
varies between 5 m and 8 m. A typical
cast-net has a retrieving line of 4-10 m in
length and is attached to the apical
portion. In some cast-nets, the lead line is
tucked underneath and attached at
intervals to the inner side of the net to form
pockets for trapping fish.
For a good fishing operation, thephysique of the fisherman has tomatch the size of the cast-net. The
net is thrown on sighting a shoal of fish in
such a way that it opens and unfolds to
cover the greatest possible area of the
water surface. Simultaneously, the net is
allowed to sink to the bottom of the water,
trapping some of the fish species and
catching others in the pockets. The net is
left in that position for three to five
minutes before it is gently, but skillfully,
drawn into the canoe with the retrieving
line.
Cast-nets are also used by fishermen who
wade in shallow waters of 0.5-1.2 m depth.
Group cast-netting is also practised in the
Lagos lagoon mainly by the migrant
Beninois fishermen. Eight to 15 canoes,
each manned by at least two men, form a
circle. The nets are cast simultaneously in
either a clockwise or anticlockwise
direction. In a few instances, two lines of
fishermen face each other and cast their
nets into the area between them, starting
from one end to the other. In such an
operation, the catches are shared equally
among the fishermen. 
Another type of gear is the conical net
thrown/operated from the shore/canoe
to cover an area of the water surface and
allowed to sink and close in on the fish.
The symmetrical net is constructed with
either rectangular panels or a big
rectangular panel is joined diagonally to
form a cone.
The efficiency of this gear depends on (i)
the size/area and volume of the net,
which should match the physique of the
fisherman; (ii) whether the design
incorporates pockets or not; and (iii) the
sinking speed of the net. The falling gear
are often used both intensively and
extensively in calm waters for a rapid
sampling of the fish population.
Gill-nets constitute the most abundant
small-scale fishing gear in Nigeria. They
include the monofilament and
multifilament set gill-nets for demersal
fish species in the coastal waters or inland
water bodies; drift gill-nets for sardines
and bonga and shark, as well as the
encircling gill-nets for sardines and bonga.
(Trammel nets, which belong to the group,
are rare; not only are they not sustainable
but they are also costly.)
Traps occur in various shapes and
forms—pot-like, rectangular or
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cylindrical basket cages made of bamboo,
netting material, cane or wire gauze. 
The gura trap made of syntheticnetting material is cylindrical inshape. However, its lower surface
is wider than the upper surface. Each trap
is provided with a mouth opening or
entrance (with or without a non-return
valve) and chamber(s) for fish collection,
irrespective of the shape or the design or
the material used in the construction.
Catch efficiency depends on the size,
mouth opening, bait type and leaching
time, tidal current and other factors. Such
gear retains the high quality of fish
caught. The pots or the closely knit basket
traps do not allow small fish to escape.
The stow-net is a conical bag made of
multifilament nylon netting used in the
sea, estuaries and lagoons to catch shrimp
and small fish as well as brackish water
eel (Ophichthus ophis). It is known as nkoto
(in Kalabari), esik (in Ibibio), asuwe (in
Yoruba) and asu (in Itsekiri). 
The trap has a rectangular mouth that
tapers to the bag. The netting material
surrounding the mouth has a bigger
stretched mesh size (100 mm), with
thicker twine. The netting material and
stretched meshes are progressively
reduced in size towards the bag, which
has 3–10 mm mesh sizes and are made of
R300 tex twine thickness. 
A very big stow-net, 30.5 m long with a
mouth opening 15 m wide and 4 m high,
has been observed. The gear is fixed
against the tide by means of anchors or
stakes. When anchors are used, the gear is
inspected once a day for shrimp caught,
since the mouth and body of the gear are
automatically reversed with the changes
of tide. However, when stakes are used,
the trap has to be harvested just at the
change of tide, and the mouth of gear
manually reversed. Occasionally, the
smaller size of this gear can be towed by
two fishers either wading in the shallow
(1.5-m deep) water or operating from two
canoes. The stow-net is operated
throughout the year but the best fishing
season is between November-December
and April-May. 
At sea, the nkoto filter net is attached to a
motorized plank canoe (7–11 m long and
1.7 m wide) and towed by a 8–15 hp
outboard engine. The operation of the
filter net in the nearshore coastal water
conflicts with other small-scale fishing
gear, which are damaged. Commercial
fish species, including shiny nose, are also
greatly impaired.
Barrier nets
The barrier-net, in its simplest form, is a
fence of bamboo and palm fronds erected
across the channel connecting the swamp
with the river at high tide, in order to
cordon off the fish. At low tide, the fish are
stranded and picked up by hand or
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collected in a basket from the mud.
V-shape fences also form barriers across
rivers, streams or creeks and are fitted
with one large iganna trap at the centre of
the narrow opening for collecting the fish.
In hook-and-line fishing, a hook isfixed to a line only or to a line attachedto a pole. Many hooks fixed to many
secondary lines (snoods) are attached to
the main line. The longlines include the set
longlines and the drifting longlines, which
are used in the coastal waters, rivers, lakes
and creeks. 
Efficiency depends on size (hooks vary in
size and are numbered from 1 to 20, with
No. 20 being the smallest), quantity and
shape of bait (artificial lure or natural
bait), soak time and other factors.  A
positive correlation obtains between hook
and fish size. 
Efficiency is also highly associated with
the feeding pattern of the fish and the type
of food as well as seasonal and diurnal
variations in feeding behaviour. Hooking
without bait also occurs when the fish get
hooked by their scales, gills, fins or other
appendages. Hausa fishermen use
unbaited bottom-set marimari or mamari
longlines to catch soft and scaleless fish
such as Clarias spp.
Spears are used mostly in rivers and
creeks for killing, wounding or grappling
with fish. They have metallic heads and
are used extensively at night with torches,
flares and hunters’ carbide lamps to catch
large fishes, such as Lates niloticus,
Gymnarchus sp. and Chrysichthys
nigrodigitatus. In some cases, spears,
matchets and axes are used along with
other types of fishing gear, such as lines,
gill-nets and traps. They are used
throughout the year but mostly in the dry
season between November and April.
The other miscellaneous fishing gear and
methods used in Nigeria include
scoop-nets used to scoop up mechanically
stunned fish; gathering by hand; using
chemicals and ichthyotoxic plant poisons;
and using hand grenades/bombs and
locally made dynamites, which are
generally prohibited in Nigeria. The latter
may result in accidental loss of lives, while
the former taint the fish and contaminate
the water bodies. In both cases, the fish,
including juvenile, immature specimens,
are killed. 
The artisanal fishing gear types with small
meshes (25–45 mm) catch juvenile
immature fish and thereby inflict a great
toll on the populations of commercial fish
like the catfish (Chrysichthys
nigrodigitatus). A minimum of 50-mm
mesh size is thereby recommended in
order to mitigate against overexploitation
of the resources.
Some of the gear types are used
throughout the year, while others are
seasonal. The gear performance and
efficiency are influenced by
environmental factors, including tidal
current and the lunar cycle, as well as the
behaviour of the target species.
The fishing practices or operational
methods in the sector tend to be
labour-intensive, with low technological
applications or minimal mechanical
assistance. The canoes are mainly
non-motorized. The total investment in
fishing gear, canoe and other accessories
is generally low, compared to the
industrial sector. In other words, the
small-scale fishery sector is characterized
by low capital outlay and low operational
costs, with variable and low fishing
productivity, which generates low
revenues.
The high costs of some fishing inputs, lack
of subsidy or credit facilities plus high
interest rates have had a negative impact
on the sector.
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Labour
Fishing for labour standards
The International Labour Organization is seeking 
views of revising standards on work in the fishing sector
At its 283rd Session, held in March2002, the Governing Body of theInternational Labour
Organization (ILO) placed on the agenda
of the 92nd Session of the International
Labour Conference in June 2004 at
Geneva, an item concerning a
comprehensive standard on work in the
fishing sector. 
This is within the context of revising ILO
Conventions (binding for countries that
ratify them) and Recommendations (not
binding, but providing guidance)
adopted before 1985, in order to update
and strengthen the standards-setting
system of ILO. The ILO Conventions of
relevance to fishing were adopted in 1959
and 1966, while the Recommendations
pertinent to fishing were adopted in 1920
and 1966. 
The 93rd Session of the International
Labour Conference in 2005 is expected to
adopt the revised standards in the fishing
sector. It is proposed that the new
standard(s) would revise the existing
seven ILO instrumentsfive Conventions
and two Recommendations that apply to
persons working on fishing vessels. The
existing Conventions concern minimum
age, medical examination, articles of
agreement, accommodation and
competency certificates, while the
existing Recommendations relate to
vocational training and hours of work. 
As a comprehensive standard, issues
hitherto not addressed in relation to
persons working on board fishing vessels
would be taken up, namely, occupational
safety and health, and social security. The
ILO also intends to provide protection for
persons working on both large and small
fishing vessels. The ILO believes that the
objectives of the new instruments should
be to extend coverage to reach as many
persons working on board fishing vessels
as possible; minimize obstacles to
ratification; provide a better chance for
wide ratification; enable the provisions to
be implemented into practice; and
minimize the risk of the Convention
becoming outdated in a short period of
time. 
The new standard would take into
account the provisions of the 1995 FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries and it would try to integrate the
work of the ILO with that of other
international organizations concerned
with fisheries and the operation of fishing
vessels. This, the ILO believes, would
result in the standard being clearly
understood and to be found more
acceptable not only by ministries
responsible for labour issues but also by
those responsible for fisheries
management and vessel safety, as well as
fishing vessel owners and those working
on fishing vessels.
The ILO is circulating a questionnaire
among member countries to elicit views
on the content of a comprehensive
standard.  Governments have been
requested to consult with the most
representative organizations of
employers and workers before finalizing
their replies to the questionnaire. They
have been especially asked to contribute
to an internationally shared sense of what
should or should not be addressed in the
proposed new Convention and
Recommendation.
Maritime fishing
According to ILO, the seven existing ILO
instruments concerning work on board
fishing vessels set out their scope in
different ways. Generally, they provide
that they apply to vessels engaged in
maritime fishing in salt waters.  Several
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provide exceptions or exemptions for
certain categories of fishing vessels (those
engaged in whaling or recreational
fishing, or those primarily propelled by
sail) or for fishing vessels operating in
certain areas (like ports, harbours and
estuaries of rivers). Some provide that the
instrument applies, in whole or in part, to
fishing vessels of a certain size (measured
as vessel length in feet and metres, or
tonnage) or engine power.
For the purpose of the proposedConvention, the term ‘fishingvessel’ is defined as any vessel used
or intended for use in the commercial
exploitation of living marine resources,
including mother ships and any other
vessels directly engaged in fishing
operations. 
Many States regulate some aspects of
conditions of work on board fishing
vessels according to the area of operation
of the vessel. Rather than depend on
nebulous categories like ‘coastal’,
‘inshore’, ‘offshore’, ‘small-scale’ and
‘artisanal’ to delimit the area of
operations, the ILO is trying to improve
clarity in the use of terms concerning the
area of operation. In its questionnaire it
proposes five areas of operation: (a)
vessels engaged in fishing operations in
the high seas and in waters other than
those of the flag State; (b) vessels engaged
in fishing operations up to the limits of the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the flag
State; (c) vessels engaged in fishing
operations up to the limits of the territorial
waters of the flag State; (d) vessels
engaged in fishing operations up to three
miles from the baseline; and (e) vessels
engaged in fishing operations in rivers
and inland waters. It then seeks to know if
the Convention should apply to fishing
vessels in all these areas of operation or
whether it should consider the possibility
of excluding fishing vessels within, and
below, the territorial limits.
If ‘areas of operation’ would not be an
appropriate method of delimiting the
scope of the Convention, the
questionnaire seeks the views on using
different categories such as ‘fishing vessel
length’, ‘tonnage’, and  ‘time fishing
vessel spends at sea’.  It also includes
questions on whether the Convention
should apply to all persons working on
board fishing vessels, irrespective of
nationality.
Views sought
The questionnaire seeks views on
provisions concerning the minimum age
for work on board fishing vessels and
whether or not there should be
exemptions. It also seeks to know if certain
fishing vessels and certain types and
conditions of work on fishing vessels
should be prohibited for persons under
the age of 18 years. Under the category of
‘medical examination’, the questionnaire
seeks to know if the Convention should
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provide that persons working on board
fishing vessels should undergo initial and
subsequent periodic medical
examinations, and whether the
Convention should provide for
exemptions from this requirement. 
If medical examination is required, itseeks to know if a person should holda medical certificate attesting to
fitness for the work for which he or she is
to be employed at sea. 
The questionnaire section on medical care
at sea seeks to know if fishing vessels
should be required to carry appropriate
medical supplies and whether the fishing
vessel should have on board a person
qualified or trained in first aid or other
forms of medical care. It also asks if
certain fishing vessels should be excluded
from this requirement.
Under ‘contracts for work’, the
questionnaire seeks to know if every
person working on board a fishing vessel
should have a written contract or articles
of agreement. It seeks to clarify the
categories of persons working on board
fishing vessels who could be exempted
from the provisions concerning written
contracts. It also seeks to know whether
or not persons working on board a fishing
vessel should have access to appropriate
mechanisms for the settlement of
disputes concerning their contract or
article of agreement.
Under ‘accommodation and provisions
on board fishing vessels’, the
questionnaire seeks to know if all fishing
vessels should have appropriate
accommodation and sufficient food and
drinking water for the service of the
fishing vessel and if there is any need for
exemptions. Under ‘crewing of fishing
vessels’, it seeks to know if States should
take measures to ensure that fishing
vessels have sufficient and competent
crew for safe navigation and fishing
operations in accordance with
international standards. 
The views on the need for a provision for
minimum periods of rest on board fishing
vessels, in accordance with national laws
and regulations, is also sought. The
questionnaire asks whether occupational
safety and health provisions should cover
persons working on board fishing vessels.
More specifically, it seeks to know if it
should be an extension of general
occupational safety and health provisions,
or an extension of maritime occupational
safety and health provisions, or specific
provisions for work on board fishing
vessels, or a combination of any of these. 
Social security
Under ‘social security’, the questionnaire
seeks to know if all persons working on
board fishing vessels should be entitled to
the social security benefits applicable to
other workers, and if the Convention
should provide for the possible exemption
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of certain categories of persons working
on board fishing vessels.
The questionnaire seeks to know ifthe Convention should providethat persons working on board the
high seas and distant-water fishing
vessels should have labour conditions
which are no less favourable than those
provided to seafarers engaged in
commercial maritime transport, and if
such provision should cover persons
working on board other fishing vessels. It
also seeks to obtain views on having
provisions for recruitment and placement,
identity documents and repatriation. 
Regarding ‘enforcement’, the
questionnaire seeks to know if the
Convention should provide that States
should adopt measures to verify
compliance with the provisions of the
Convention and whether or not any
category of fishing vessels should be
exempted from this requirement. Views of
representative organizations are also
sought on including a provision on port
State control.  The questionnaire also
seeks the views of respondents on the
need for including a provision in the
Convention for consultation with
representative employers and workers
organizations, as well as representative
organizations of persons working on
board fishing vessels in the development
and implementation of national laws and
regulations concerning conditions of
work on board fishing vessels. 
The questionnaire seeks to know if the
proposed Recommendation should
provide guidance on (a) the types of work
or fishing vessels that should not be
employing persons under the age of 18; (b)
the content of the medical certificate and
the medical procedures to be followed for
issuing it; (c) the content of the medicine
chest and the type of medical equipment
or first-aid kit required to be carried on
board fishing vessels; (d) the content of
contracts or articles of agreement for work
on board fishing vessels; (e) specification
of insurance coverage for persons
working on board fishing vessels in the
event of injury, illness or death; (f)
contracts or articles of agreements for
work on board fishing vessels; and (g)
systems of remuneration, including those
based on a share of the catch.
The questionnaire also seeks to know if
the Recommendation should provide that
States should have national laws and
regulations concerning planning and
control of crew accommodation on board
fishing vessels; on providing guidance
concerning standards of accommodation,
food and drinking water. It also seeks to
know if the guidance on accommodation
and provisions on board fishing vessels
should make distinctions based on fishing
vessel length, operating area, tonnage and
time spent at sea. Views on guidance
concerning hours of work or rest periods
are sought, including the limits of
working hours or provisions for
minimum rest periods. 
Regarding ‘occupational safety and
health’, the questionnaire asks if the
Recommendation should address the
inclusion of fishing occupational safety
and health issues in an integrated national
policy on occupational safety and health.
The questionnaire also seeks to know if
the Recommendation should include
guidance on social security provisions for
persons working on board fishing vessels.
Views are sought on the Recommendation
including provisions concerning
maintenance by the competent authority
of a register of persons working on board
fishing vessels. Lastly, the questionnaire
seeks to know if the Recommendation
should provide that coastal States should
require, when they grant licences for
fishing in their EEZs, that fishing vessels
conform with the standards of this
Convention. 
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ews Round-up
Stock meet
The Second Wormal
Meeting of the States
Parties to the
Agreement for the
Implementation of
the Provisions of the
United Nations
Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982
relating to the
Conservation and
Management of
Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks
will be held from 23
to 25 July 2003 at
United Nan ns
Headquqrters in New
York.
The meeting is
expected to review
the implementation
of the Fi h Stocks
Agreement, including
the establislunent of
the Assistance Fund
to assist developing
States Parties.
Licensed to fish
Three East African
coun tries-Kenya,
Uganda and
Tanzania-have
started issuing
licences in Lake
Victoria to end the
50
current crossborder
fishing conflicts.
According to
Caroline Mukasa, a
senior economist
with the Lake
Victoria Fisheries
Org~ation(LVFO~
districts along the
borders have been
mandated to issue the
fishing licences.
A report presented to
the East African
Legislative Assembly
by Osienalla, a
Kenyan-based GO,
shows that about 115
Kenyans have to date
been arrested for
illegal fishing in
neighbouring
countries.
The World
Conservation (lUCN)
says the conflicts
have been sparked by
competition for the
Nile Perch, which is
in high demand.
Meanwhile, the LVFO
has helped Kenyan
fishermen living
around Lake Victoria
to patent their
commercial lifeline,
the Nile Perch.
Subsidy proposed
A local delegation in
Chile belonging to
the "Friends of Fish"
group has presented
a new proposal on
possible approaches
to improved
disciplines on
fisheries subsidies to
the Negotiating
Group on Rules of
the World Trade
Organization (wro).
Members of the
"Friend ofFish"
group include the us,
Argentina, Iceland,
New Zealand,
Norway and Peru, as
well as d1ile.
After considering
previous submissions
of the us and the EU,
All subsidies that
promote overcapacity
and overfishing
would be included in
the "red box".
The "amber box"
would include all
other subsidies that
do not cause injury to
other Members, and
would only occur
after other Members
receive notification.
EU in Mauritania
The pre ident of
Mauritania ha
ratified a fisheries
access agreement
with Spain. The
agreement signed
with the European
Union gives Spanish
French, Portuguese,
Itaban, and British
ve sels access to fish
tuna in Mauritanian
waters.
The agreement,
promoted by the
Spanish government,
allows 39 vessels
belonging to the
national fleet to
operate in
Mauritanian fishing
ground and will
remain in force until
2 December 2003.
Under the terms of
the agreement, the EU
will help to set up
cientific and
technical aspec f
the fisheries,
including
surveillance, to be
funded out of the Ell
420,000 annual
budg t uppli d by
the EU.
Trawl ban
Th environmental
agency of Brazil,
Ibarna, has banned
coastal trawling in
the north ast m
States of Piaw, Cearci-
Rio Grande do Norte
and Pernambuco.
The regulations aim
to reduce catches of
undersized fish
thr ugh
indiscriminate use of
trawl nets.
They should also
help to protect
manat e that inhabit
the north a t coast
and to reduce the
incidenc of dispute
between fishermen
using manual trawls
and those using
motorized trawl gear.
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Fines of
BRL70,000-100,000
(uS$24,750-35,350)
will be imposed for
any breach in
regulations,
depending on the
severity of the offence.
Fishy warning
Local fish stocks
contaminated with
toxins and a perilous
drop in shellfish
catches are signalling
to millions of
Japanese that their
favourite food is in
danger. The per
capita consumption
of seafood in Japan is
around 70 kg, among
the highest in the
world.
Fears of mercury
poisoning have led to
warnings about
consuming popular
species, including the
bright-red sea bream
called kinmedai
(alfonsin) and
swordfish, both of
which are expensive
delicacies.
The other species that
are the subjects of the
warning include
cheaper tuna and
shark, and sperm
whale.
The official warning
is that the mercury
content in the fish, at
0.44 parts per million
(ppm), can harm
foetuses.
Mercury poisoning,
in the form of
methylmercury,
affects the nervous
system and the
symptoms and
condition are similar
to those found in
Minamata, Japan's
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worst case of
industrial pollution.
Can that duty
!hec~g industry
m Spam 15 up in
arms over the EU cuts
in import duty on
canned tuna from
Thailand, Philippines
and Indonesia.
Backed by their
French, Portuguese
and Italian
counterparts,
representatives are
calling on the
European Parliament
for support to protect
the industry from
measures that offer
advantages to
third-country imports.
The European
Council's decision
allows 25,000 tonnes
of cans from
Thailand, Philippines
and Indonesia to
enter the EU with a 12
per cent tariff, from 1
July onwards. The
previous tariff rate
was 24 per cent. The
Council's ruling also
allows a 12 per cent
increase in the
amount of imports in
2004.
Some canners believe
the Council's decision
will open the
floodgates for more
countries to seek the
same privileges for
their canned
production.
Pacific teuna
The European Union
has just announced
that three European
countries have won
the right to fish for
tuna off the Pacific
State of Kiribati.
Up to 23 Spanish,
Porhlguese and
French vessels will
receive a licence to
fish for tuna in the
Kiribati fisheries
zone, an area
covering 3.5 mn sq
km, following an
agreement between
the EU and the island
republic.
The European vessels
will join the 1,200
other vessels already
fislUng in the area for
30 years, from Japan,
Korea, China,
TaiwaI\ the
Philippines and the
us, reports
Associated Press.
With half the world's
canned tuna supply
coming from the
central and western
Pacific, this ocean
offers an annual catch
of around 1 ron
tonnes of tuna,
valued at uS$2 bn.
Kiribati earns several
million dollars each
~ear from fishing
licenses from Asian
countries, and wiil
receive uS$600,OOO
from the EU for the
new licences for the
first year of fi hing.
The EU is also
investigating further
potential deals with
other Pacific Island
States, such as the
Marshalllslands,
Solomon Islands
Micronesia and '
Papua New Guinea.
Precious lives
Owners of fishing
boats in South Africa
will have to insure .
the lives of their
ere·w, under a new
law that is currently
being drafted by the
South African
Maritime Safety
Authority (Sam a).
The move follows a
spate of drownings
off the South African
coast this year.
So far thi year 16
fishermen have lost
their lives, while, last
year, 51 commercial
fishermen who put
out in small craft
drowned.
Owners wh do not
comply with the law
will face heavy
penalties. The
proposed law
requires
documentation that
shows a level of basic
training, and will also
stipulate that
insurance policies
should cover casual
workers.
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%e river is witliin us, tIie sen is a[[a60ut us;
'1Tie sea is the fad's eage a£So, thegranite
Into w/iidi it readies, the 6eadies where it tosses
Its liints ofearfier adother creatiJJn:
'1Tie starfisli, the fwrsesfwe cra6, the wfwfe's 6ackftone;
%e poofs wliere it offers to our curiosity
'1Tie more aeBeate a(gae ana the sea anemone.
It tosses up our fosses, the torn seine!
'1Tie sfwttered fo6sterpot, the 6ro~n oar
Jilna thegear offoreign aeaamen
'1Tie sea fws maTUf voices,
!Manygorfs anamany voices.
•
- fromDry Salvages, Four Quartets by T 5 Eliot
ICSF is an international NGO
working on issues that concern
fishworkers the world over. It is
in status with the Economic and
Social Council of the UN and is
on itO'S Special List of Non-
GovemmentallntemaUonai Or-
ganizations. It also has Liaison
Status with FAa. Registered in
Geneva, ICSF has offices in
Chennai, India and Brussels,
Belgium. As aglobal network of
community organizers,
teachers, technicians, re-
searchers and scientists, ICSPS
activities encompass monitor-
ing and research, exchange
and training, campaigns and
acUon, as weii as communica'
tions.SAMUDRA REPORT invites
contributions and responses.
Correspondence should be ad-
dressed to the Chennai office.
The opinions and posilions
expressed in the articles are
those of the authors concerned
and do not necessarily repre-
sent the official views of ICSF.
SAMUDRA REPORT can now be ac-
cessed on ICSPS home page on
the World Wide Web at
http://www.icsf.net or
http://www.icsf.org
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